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Abstract 
 This thesis examines the relationship between the indigenous peoples and the 
electoral success of Evo Morales in the 2002 and 2005 Bolivian presidential elections.  
Morales earned a surprising 20% of the vote in 2002 enough for second place.  In 2005, 
Morales earned over 50% of the presidential vote.  He is the first indigenous president of 
Bolivia and is the first to receive over 50% of the vote since the re-transition to 
democracy.  The electoral success of Morales has been framed in the context of the 
indigenousness in Bolivia, the country with the highest proportions of indigenous peoples 
in South America.  This thesis explores whether or not indigenousness offers a 
compelling explanation for the unprecedented electoral success for Evo Morales in the 
2002 and 2005 elections.  The findings of this thesis suggest that the relationship between 
Morales‟s electoral performance and indigenousness is not as strong as previously 
suggested.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Indigenousness in Bolivia has been regarded as a source for Evo Morales‟s 
electoral victory in 2005, the first indigenous president in Bolivia.  Morales, a cocalero 
(coca grower) turned politician, defied the electoral trends of Bolivia when he was 
elected as the first full-blooded indigenous president in the country‟s history.  He first 
contested for the presidency in the 2002 election where he placed second with 
approximately 20% of the national vote.  In 2005, Morales increased his share of the vote 
to over 50% becoming the first president to win a majority of the vote since the re-
transition to democracy.  The 2002 and 2005 presidential elections were held in a context 
of political turmoil and increased reflections upon indigenous identity.  Morales‟s victory 
was seen as a success for indigenous people as scholars, politicians, and the media were 
quick to highlight the importance of indigenousness when analyzing the results of the 
2002 and 2005 elections.  This analysis will examine the relationship between 
indigenousness and the propensity to vote for Evo Morales.   
1.1 Purpose of the Study 
In examining the rise of Morales, and his party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), 
in the 2002 election and his victory in 2005, I primarily concern myself with the 
relationship between indigenousness and the rise of MAS.  I define indigenousness as an 
ethnicity in which a person identifies as being a descendent of the pre-Hispanic 
inhabitants of Bolivia.  Taking the changes of Bolivian politics into consideration, I 
develop two goals for this project: 
1. To understand the relationship between indigenousness and the MAS’s 
performance in 2002 and 2005 
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2. To understand the relationship between the selected control variables of 
socio-economic indicators, employment by sector, and the variation 
among Bolivia’s nine departments1 and MAS’s electoral victory in 2002 
and 2005 
These two goals highlight possible sources for Evo Morales‟s electoral success.  Through 
an empirical examination, we can attempt to better understand the relationship between 
the performance of MAS and the indigenous peoples.  
I believe an empirical study of this phenomenon will show that this relationship 
has been misdiagnosed.  The perceived relationship between the indigenous movements 
and the rise of MAS is an indication of other factors and not indigenousness itself, 
especially considering its high correlation with indicators pointing to a low quality of life.  
Previous research on indigenousness and the ascension of MAS has relied upon 
constructivist theories of identity, thick descriptions of indigenous politics, and basic 
analyses of socio-economic indicators and their effects upon indigenous political activity 
(Albro 2005; Albro 2006; Andolina, Radcliffe, and Laurie 2005; Cleary 2006; Madrid 
2005; Van Cott 2000).  These have not systematically examined the ascension of 
Morales‟s party and its relationship to the electoral behavior of the indigenous peoples.  
This analysis seeks to build on this previous research by using a statistical analysis to 
better understand the electoral performance of Morales and his political party.   
The motivation for studying the improved electoral performance of MAS is to 
deepen our knowledge of the evolution in Bolivian politics.  The country has experienced 
                                                 
1
 Bolivia consists of nine sub-national political units that operate like states in the United States.  These 
units are referred to as Departments 
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a shift in the political scene as many indigenous leaders now serve with traditional 
political elites in the chambers of Bolivia‟s congress.  By understanding the role of 
indigenousness, and more generally the role of identity in electoral behavior, we can 
better explore the sources of this change in Bolivia‟s politics.  This research also carries 
implications for parts of the world experiencing similar political shifts whereby new 
parties or historically disenfranchised groups rise to power around what appear to be 
mobilizations around identity.  
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The indigenous actors in Bolivia are not a new source of tumult nor have they 
been politically neglected by the elites.  Their apparent political empowerment of Evo 
Morales through the presidential elections, however, has yet to be empirically examined.  
Scholars have articulated many ideas concerning the rise and success of MAS as a viable 
political entity.  These discussions typically center on the political empowerment of 
indigenous peoples, structural changes like decentralization policies, and politicization of 
the ethnic movements (Rice and Van Cott 2006; Cleary 2006; Hiskey and Seligson 
2003).  There is no doubt that these all are important contextual factors that help define 
the emergence of MAS.  However, these discussions have overstated the importance of 
the indigenousness in the Bolivian shift.  This thesis begins to answer the general 
question why MAS and Morales performed surprisingly well in 2002 and gained an 
unprecedented victory in 2005.  The primary question to determine relationship between 
indigenous peoples and the shift towards MAS: 
How did indigenous self-identification affect propensity to vote for MAS in 2002 and 
2005? 
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I include three additional questions to supplement the primary question with the intention 
of developing a coherent model that can be used to explain MAS-like shifts in other 
countries.  These questions, developed through a review of the literature and the apparent 
causes of the volatility in Bolivia, are: 
1. Is there a relationship between the electoral performance of MAS in 2002 and in 
2005 and socio-economic characteristics of MAS supporters? 
2. Is there a relationship between the electoral performance of MAS votes in 2002 
and in 2005 and employment by economic sectors of MAS supporters? 
3. Is there a relationship between the electoral performance MAS votes in 2002 and 
in 2005 and the location by department and MAS supporters? 
For these questions, the null hypotheses are: 
H1: There is no relationship between the proportions of indigenous 
peoples in a municipality and the votes for MAS in 2002 and 2005. 
H2: There is no relationship between the socio-economic conditions 
pointing to a lower quality of life in a municipality and the votes for MAS 
in 2002 and 2005. 
H3: There is no relationship between employment in a sector of the 
economy in a municipality and the votes for MAS in 2002 and 2005. 
H4: There is no relationship between the location by department of voters and the 
votes for MAS in 2002 and 2005. 
The question of indigenousness and MAS performance is central to this analysis.  
Scholars have examined the strategic importance of indigenousness in Bolivian politics 
and the structural conditions that have created opportunities for parties like MAS to rise.  
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This analysis builds upon these previous analyses to understand whether or not that 
indigenousness was crucial to the electoral performance of MAS.   
1.3 Describing Bolivia  
 To grasp the nature of Bolivian politics, one must understand that Bolivia has a 
diverse ethnic and economic composition. This South American state has the highest 
proportion of indigenous peoples in the region, with Quechua and Aymara as the largest 
groups (CIA World Fact Book).  This carries significant implications for Bolivian 
politics, as I will indicate below. 
 Bolivia‟s rich natural resources, especially natural gas, have also impacted the 
political scene with competing demands for regional autonomy and the nationalization of 
gas.  The question of gas was central to the toppling of President Sánchez de Lozada in 
2003 and again in 2005 when President Carlos Mesa resigned from office.  The mining 
sector has been traditionally strong, especially in the area of tin, but the collapse of the tin 
market and the privatization schemes during the neo-liberal economic transition in the 
1980s left many miners unemployed.  Many of these miners turned to coca cultivation as 
an alternative form of work because it seemingly offers a stable source of income (CIA 
World Fact Book).  However, coca growth is controversial in Bolivia and abroad due to 
its association with cocaine production and the drug trade.  The Chaparé region near 
Cochabamba is especially conducive to the cultivation of coca and has become the 
epicenter of cocalero organizing and anti-drug activities, including rise of MAS in the 
late 1990s.   
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1.4 Methodology 
 Utilizing a statistical approach, I empirically examine the relationship between the 
rise of MAS and indigenousness at the municipal level in Bolivia.  The election results 
for 2002 and 2005, which serve as the dependent variable, were obtained from the Córte 
Electoral Nacional (CNE).  MAS‟s performance was measured as a proportion of the 
total votes received to minimize the impact of regional population centers.  In this 
manner I can uniformly test the relationship between indigenousness and the rise of MAS 
across the municipalities in Bolivia.   
The independent variables were aggregated into four groups.  First, I included a 
demographic variable to understand the relationship between indigenousness and the rise 
of MAS.  Second, the analysis examines the relationship between socio-economic 
variables, employment by economic sector, and departmental variation to understand how 
these factors may affect voter behavior.  Bolivia‟s nine departments are geographically 
and demographically distinct, creating two blocs in what can be considered the western 
highlands (Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro, and Potosi) and the eastern 
lowlands (El Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz, and Tarija).  These four sets of variables were 
primarily collected from the Bolivian census from 2000.  Several of the variables were 
also collected from the Instituto Nacional Estadistical (INE), the main statistical agency 
of the Bolivian government.  While this examination of the rise of MAS may only be a 
snapshot of the time,
2
 it still provides a level generalizability because of the complete and 
coherent nature of the analysis. 
                                                 
2
 I borrowed the term “snapshot” terminology from Roberta Rice and Donna Lee Van Cott in their article 
“The Emergence and Performance of Indigenous Peoples‟ Parties in South America: A Subnational 
Statistical Analysis.” 
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I believe this statistical analysis will provide needed breadth to the existing 
literature and more important generate new questions for exploration.  Studies of 
indigenous political movements in the developing world are often undertaken with a 
qualitative approach, but the quantitative methods can allow us to empirically test these 
qualitative notions.  With some effort, we can employ the quantitative approach to form 
an effective and coherent argument about broader trends of our questions.    
1.5 Organization of the Study 
This thesis is organized in the following way: Chapters 2 provides some 
background of Bolivia, including the history of the relationship between political parties 
and indigenous peoples in Bolivia, the formation of MAS, and the 2002 and 2005 
presidential elections.  Chapter 3 discusses indigenousness and its relation to politics, 
socio-economic factors and politics, political implications of divisions by economic 
sectors and politics, and departmental differences and political implications.  In Chapter 
4, highlights the methodological approach, the data collection, and the operationalization 
of the variables.  Chapter 5 shares the results of the statistical analyses, and Chapter 6 
assesses the question of importance and concludes the analysis. 
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Chapter 2: Background 
 The electoral victory of MAS may be construed as a widespread rejection of the 
political establishment and the neo-liberal economic policies that have failed to generate 
the promised economic growth.  It may also be deemed an exercise of indigenousness.  
The relationship between the indigenous peoples as a political force and the success of 
MAS needs to be studied.  Scholars have explained indigenous patterns of behavior in 
terms of politicization of ethnicity (Van Cott 2000; Birnir and Van Cott 2007; Yashar 
2006), shakeups in the economic system (Domingo 2005; Van Cott 2006), and structural 
changes such as the constitutional and electoral reforms of the early to mid-1990s 
(Hiskey and Seligson 2003; Postero 2004; Gurr 2000; Madrid 2007).  My approach 
builds upon these previous approaches by empirically and directly testing the importance 
of indigenousness on the performance of MAS in 2002 and 2005. 
The results of my analysis can be better understood with the following sections 
highlighting the history and context of Bolivian politics.  In this chapter, I highlight why 
Bolivia is a case study for understanding the role of identity and political behavior.  I 
additionally elaborate on the history of the political party system and indigenous peoples 
in Bolivia, the formation of MAS, and provide a brief discussion on the 2002 and 2005 
elections. 
2.1 Bolivia as a Case Study for Latin America 
The rise of MAS as a political power in Bolivia is indicative of the changing 
atmosphere in Bolivian politics.  Using Bolivia as a case study, we can generalize our 
findings and apply our model to areas experiencing similar political shifts.  There have 
been political shifts in several Latin American states, including electoral shifts in 
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Venezuela and Brazil and uprisings in Peru, Ecuador, and Mexico.  These shifts appear to 
be a rejection of the establishment and of the neo-liberal economic policies.  Bolivia, 
however, is unique in several ways.  With the highest proportion of indigenous peoples in 
Latin America, it provides us with a unique and identifiable source of the electoral 
success of Morales.  The high levels of poverty and other low ranking quality of life 
indicators are also widespread that Bolivia ranks as the poorest and least developed state 
in South America.   
 It may be easy to assert that Bolivia is not representative of a typical Latin 
American state, depending on one‟s definition, because of these unique characteristics.  I 
argue that the conditions unique to Bolivia provide a compelling reason to proceed with 
this study.  The distinctively high, or low, measures of the variables included in this 
analysis create an opportunity for clear rather than diluted results.   
2.2 History of the Political Party System and Indigenous Peoples 
The current relationship between the political parties and the indigenous peoples 
in Bolivia is not a new development.  To understand the 2002 electoral performance and 
the 2005 MAS presidential victory, we must contextualize Bolivian politics through a 
historical analysis of the relationship of Bolivia‟s political party system with the 
indigenous peoples.  In 1952, a joint revolt by the Movimiento Nacionalista 
Revolucionario (MNR) and the indigenous peoples brought the MNR to power.  This 
changed Bolivia as the MNR introduced universal suffrage, sweeping land reform, and 
the nationalization of the mines in exchange for indigenous popular support (Gurr 2000, 
179; Whitehead 2001, 26).  In the coming years, the state-indigenous relationship became 
entrenched in a corporatist system in which parties provided incentives to indigenous 
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groups and labor organizations in exchange for votes (Yashar 2006, 191).  The state also 
implemented policies that recognized the indigenous peoples as campesinos, or peasants, 
rather than ethnic minorities.  The failure to offer protective measures for the indigenous 
peoples led to the emergence of labor unions as representatives of these minority groups 
(Yashar 2006, 192, Gurr 2000, 179).   
The resulting relationship between the MNR and the labor unions implied the 
political parties were accountable to the unions and not the indigenous peoples (Barr 
2005, 79).  In 1964, a military coup overthrew the MNR administration.  Following their 
ouster from power, the party then grew increasingly fragmented due to internal squabbles 
and therefore played a minimal role in Bolivian politics.
3
  In 1974, the military regime 
massacred unarmed Quechua campesinos protesting the government‟s agricultural 
policies (Van Cott 2000, 128).  With MNR sidelined due to in-fighting and the 
diminished trust in the military forces, a new intellectual movement, the Tupaj Katari 
(Katarista), emerged within the indigenous community.  The Kataristas provided 
leadership to gain the political independence of the Confederación Sindical Unica de 
Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB), a union of peasant organizations 
initially created by the government (Gurr 2000, 179).   
In the early 1980s, the CSUTCB and the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), the 
central labor union in Bolivia projected a joint movement to bridge ethnic and class 
issues together (Van Cott 2000, 128-129).  With time, however, the Katarista movement 
grew increasingly fragmented as various ideological leaders broke ranks in hopes of 
steering the movement in their own direction (Van Cott 2000, 129).    Additionally, the 
                                                 
3
 The MNR experienced a political resurgence in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
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decline of the state-led economy led to the diminished power of labor unions as the 
privatization policies under neo-liberal economic policies left many Bolivians 
unemployed.  The political decline of the unions implied that many Bolivians were left 
with few politically accountable leaders as the political parties were traditionally 
accountable to the labor unions and not the electorate (Domingo 2005, 1736; Barr 2005, 
79).   
Following the 1978 to 1985 re-transition to democracy, the military lost much of 
its political legitimacy and was essentially forced out of politics (Domingo 2005, 1736; 
Whitehead 2001, 28).  Leftist parties, which had botched the management of the 
economy in the early 1980s under President Hernando Silas, also suffered tremendously 
(Whitehead 2001, 28).  Among the leftist parties in Bolivia, the Movimiento Izquierda 
Revolucionaria (MIR), which had been isolated by the right-wing military regime under 
General Hugo Bánzer in the 1970s, distanced itself from its previous radical left-wing 
agenda.  MIR‟s trend to the right culminated with a coalition alliance in the 1989 election 
with Bánzer‟s new right-wing party, Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN), thereby 
de-legitimizing MIR‟s leftist stances. The decreased leverage of the labor unions, the 
failure of the leftist parties, and the decline of the military created combined to create 
new opportunities for incorporation of new actors in Bolivian politics and for the 
reemergence of other political parties in the 1980s and 1990s (Whitehead 2001, 35). 
By the late 1980s, the Conciencia de Patria Movimiento Patriótico (Condepa) and 
the Nuefa Fuerza Republicana (NFR) emerged as new populist parties in Bolivia seeking 
to represent indigenous interests (Domingo 2005, 1737).  Both parties sought support 
from the CSUTCB (Domingo 2005, 1737; Van Cott 2000, 129).  Their populist 
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leadership, however, created opportunities for co-option into the coalition practices of 
Bolivian politics and so their position as being “anti-system” quickly faded (Domingo 
2005, 1737).  In this time, the MNR also reemerged as a more moderate leftist party and 
achieved electoral success in 1993.   
The MNR recruited Victor Hugo Cardenas, a former Katarista leader, as the vice-
presidential candidate for the Sánchez de Lozada ticket, representing a political success 
for the indigenous peoples of Bolivia.  During this presidency, the constitution was 
amended to declare the country as a “multi-ethnic” and “pluri-cultural” state with the 
intent of transforming the historical relationship between the state and the indigenous 
peoples (Postero 2004, 180, 189).  In 1994 Bolivia implemented the La Ley de 
Participación Popular (LPP) which decentralized the political system to incorporate 
indigenous communities (Gurr 2000, 180).  In 1996, additional reform modified the 
electoral formula establishing a mixed electoral system which introduced uninominal, or 
single member district, seats in congress, opening opportunities for parties like MAS, 
which initially had a geographically concentrated constituency due to its outgrowth from 
the cocalero movement (Domingo2005, 1732).   
The incorporation of the indigenous peoples into the Bolivian political system has 
evolved with the economic and political changes of the state.  As distinct ethnic groups in 
Bolivia, the indigenous peoples have grown increasingly powerful through their political 
organization through organizations such as the CSUTCB and involvement in groups like 
the COB.  MAS is also an outgrowth of indigenous organizing.  In the following section I 
elaborate on the origins of MAS first as a union movement of cocaleros and then its 
development as a political party.  By understanding the historical context of the 
  
13 
relationships between political parties, labor organizations, and indigenous movements, 
we better explore the unprecedented electoral performance of MAS in the 2005 election.   
2.3 Formation of MAS 
The coca growers began their political mobilization during the 1978 to 1985 
transition to democracy.  Initially, they formed federations to oppose the government‟s 
policies regarding coca eradication.  By 1990, the Chaparé region in the department of 
Cochabamba consisted of 160 local unions under the umbrella of 30 sub-federations, 
which comprise 5 federations.  In 1988 the five federations formed a coordinating 
committee to send delegates to the 1987 CSUTCB congress.  At this meeting, the 
Quechua leaders seized electoral control from the predominantly Aymara intellectuals 
(Van Cott 2006, 2).  The most important member among the cocaleros was Evo Morales, 
who migrated to the Chaparé with his Aymara father and his Quechua mother (Van Cott 
2006, 2).  In 1992, the CSUTCB, under the control of the coca growers, moved to create 
the Asamblea de la Soberánia de los Pueblos (ASP) as a political instrument.   
Morales and a competing Quechua leader emerged as the two leaders of the ASP 
and divided it into the ASP and Morales‟s IPSP (Van Cott 2005, 91-92; Van Cott 2006, 
3).  In the 1999 election, the IPSP faced registration problems and therefore was forced to 
sign under an already registered but defunct party, the Izquierda Unida (IU) and in 2002 
the IPSP used the registration name of Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) (Van Cott 2006, 
3).  As MAS grew in power, the traditional leftist parties were either de-legitimized or 
co-opted into the coalitional practices of Bolivian politics.  The indigenousness of MAS, 
especially in the context of its indigenous leadership and outgrowth from indigenous 
interests, carries implications for the successful rise between 2002 and 2005.  Scholars 
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have elaborated many ideas about the emergence and success of MAS in an indigenous 
context, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
2.4 2002 and 2005 Presidential Elections 
 The 2002 and 2005 presidential elections are the primary events examined in this 
analysis to understand the success of MAS.  In the 2002 election, Morales competed 
against Gónzalo Sánchez de Lozada, the eventual winner, and Manfred Reyes Villa, a 
four-term mayor of Cochabamba.  Sánchez de Lozada, a successful businessman, 
previously held the presidency between 1993 and 1997.  Morales and Sánchez de Lozada 
received the largest shares of the votes with Morales earning a surprising 20.94% while 
Sánchez de Lozada receiving 22.46% of the national votes (Córte Electoral Nacional).  
According to Bolivian law, since none of the presidential candidates received more than 
50% of the presidential votes, the members of Congress convened and selected the final 
winner.  As such, the Bolivian legislature appointed Sánchez de Lozada as the winner of 
the 2002 presidential election.   
 In 2005, Morales again contested for the presidency against Jorge “Tuto” 
Quiroga.  Quiroga initially served in the presidency between 2001 and 2002 after General 
Hugo Bánzer opted to step down for health reasons.  Quiroga opted to form a new party, 
Poder Democrático y Social (PODEMOS), rather than run under the ADN party.  
PODEMOS, however, was effectively structured in the same manner and advocated the 
same conservative policies as ADN.  The results of the 2005 election were substantially 
one-sided as Morales received 53.74% of the vote against Quiroga‟s 28.59%, making 
Morales an unprecedented, outright winner of the presidency.  This electoral success for 
Morales represented a success for indigenous peoples. 
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 The elections of 2002 and 2005 highlight a change in Bolivian politics.  As noted 
previously, most indigenous political activity was channeled through union and elite 
party mobilization rather than through indigenous political organization.  The electoral 
performance of MAS in 2002 and success in 2005 solidified its presence in Bolivian 
politics.  These performances also raise critical questions as to whether the vote patterns 
are related to the indigenousness of the Bolivian electorate.  In the following chapter I 
evaluate the existing literature and theory examining the relationship between the 
indigenous peoples and the electoral performance of Evo Morales in the 2002 and 2005 
presidential elections.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
16 
Chapter 3: Review of Literature and Theory 
Much research has been conducted on the nature of indigenous political 
movements in Bolivia.  The electoral success of MAS in the 2002 and 2005 presidential 
elections in Bolivia raise questions regarding the source for these performances.  Some 
scholars have argued that both socio-economic conditions and indigenousness have 
together served to spike the support MAS (Van Cott 2006, 181-182).  The strong 
correlation between the indigenous peoples and socio-economic factors make it difficult 
to ascertain the source of MAS‟s electoral success.  In this analysis, we examine Bolivia 
to better understand these relationships between parties like MAS and the electorate.  The 
following sections will highlight the relevant factors that define the context in which 
MAS rose to power between 2002 and 2005. 
3.1 Indigenousness and Politics 
The electoral victory of MAS has marked a moment of significant change for 
Bolivian politics.  Matthew Cleary argues that the victory of MAS is indicative of a 
leftist-wave that has taken hold in South America (Cleary 2006, 36).  Using James 
Petras‟s definition for leftist parties as organizations seeking to decrease social 
inequalities, increase living standards, the reversal of privatization trends, and providing 
support to other socioeconomic factors such as public education and healthcare (2006, 
280-281), it seems as though MAS falls under this category.  But MAS can also be 
classified as an ethnic party, which is defined as:  
…an organization authorized to compete in local or national elections; the majority of its 
leadership and membership identify themselves as belonging to a nondominant ethnic 
group, and its electoral platform includes demands and programs of an ethnic or cultural 
nature (Van Cott 2003, 3).   
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Supplementing this definition, ethnic parties are said to reflect ethnic divisions in society 
(Lipset 1981, 231).  Van Cott employs “indigenous” for this definition in her analysis of 
the Latin American politics (2003, 3).  MAS meet this definition if we, like Van Cott, and 
utilize the term “indigenous”.  The party has articulated a wide array of goals designed to 
improve the quality of life for indigenous peoples.  MAS also meet the second 
requirement of this definition as much of its leadership is indigenous.  Third, while 
indigenous peoples constitute a large proportion of the Bolivian population, they are 
clearly in an inferior position in society as marked by their high levels of poverty and 
historical lack of political empowerment.  Fourth, MAS has articulated demands 
centering on this notion of indigenousness.  The following quote, from the MAS mission 
statement, highlights the importance of ethnicity to the party:  
We have reached 500 years of the European presence and 176 years as a republic.  In 
these 500 years, we have been dominated by a Western philosophy, a domination that has 
yet to reach any of its goals (“Movimiento al Socialismo”).4   
 
MAS‟s campaign addressed several indigenous interests.  Leading up the 2005 election, 
MAS released its ten point plan
5
 in which the party identified goals rooted in ethnicity in 
addition to plans addressing socio-economic issues.  The party advocated for a 
constituent assembly to bring greater representation to the indigenous peoples in Bolivia 
(“Bolivian Opposition” 2005).  Along these same lines, MAS promoted the redistribution 
of idle lands towards landless peoples, many of whom are indigenous, for agricultural 
and livestock purposes. 
                                                 
4
 It should be noted that I have studied Spanish extensively as a second language, and any translation errors 
are therefore my own. 
5
 See Appendix 1 for a complete list of the ten point plan 
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MAS‟s indigenous orientation, however, is not static as shown by their victory in 
2005.  With widespread support coming from their wide appeal to the Bolivian electorate 
(Albro 2005, 450; Domingo 2005, 1738; Postero and Zamosc 2004, 17-18), we must ask 
the question of whether or not the indigenous peoples were voting in response to their 
indigenousness or other factors like socio-economic conditions.  To examine this we 
must understand the construction of social identities and the importance of saliency.  
People appeal to different identities in different times depending on the context.  
Mansbach and Ferguson state, 
In the course of their lives, people are likely to recognize only a few of their traits as 
worthy of self-definition, and behavior of other communities may even promote new 
traits or the rediscovery or reconstruction of old ones (2004, 148). 
 
This implies that the interactions across groups of people can increase the saliency of 
one‟s identity, like indigenousness, especially when these interactions are threatening. 
Threats towards an identity can increase the saliency of this identity (Lipset 1981, 204; 
Gurr and Huff 1994, 78).  The tumultuous political conditions, beginning with the coca 
eradication policies in the late 1990s, may have triggered an internal recognition of ethnic 
importance among the indigenous peoples thereby causing a policy preference change in 
favor of MAS in 2002 and 2005 (Birnir and Van Cott 2004, 100; Yashar 2006, 198-199; 
Madrid 2005, 163, 166). 
For this “ethnic trigger” to matter, we would require that indigenous voters act in 
support of a party defined along these ethnic lines (Echegaray 2005, 9).  A prime 
example of this is the struggle over the coca leaf.  The explicit attack on coca cultivation 
in the mid to late 1990s under Hugo Bánzer may have enticed many Quechua Indians to 
support MAS, a party that seeks to protect the coca crop. Since coca is also the source for 
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cocaine, cocaleros have come under significant pressure to cease their activities.  The 
campaign against coca extended to Morales‟s bid for the presidency in 2002 when the 
American ambassador to Bolivia threatened aid reduction if Bolivians voted Morales into 
office.  Coca, though a culturally important commodity for the indigenous peoples, is 
more importantly economically critical because of the high economic return to many 
indigenous farmers for cultivating this crop.
6
  Other examples of threats against 
indigenous identity may be the Water War of 2000 in Cochabamba, the current water 
issues in El Alto, and the Gas War of 2003 throughout the country.  The constant struggle 
over resources may be perceived as a threat to indigenous identity as these struggles have 
often placed essential resources, such as water, beyond the reach of the indigenous poor.   
An indigenous shift would indicate that the indigenousness of one‟s identity was 
the most important factor in the voter‟s decision.  For this shift to be a response to these 
economic factors, one would need to show that the socio-economic characteristics have 
influenced the actions of the Bolivian voters.  To show this, we would need to identify 
the non-indigenous electorate in Bolivia and examine how their behavior differs from the 
behavior of the indigenous peoples.  These two factors are not mutually exclusive as both 
the indigenous identity and the socio-economic conditions can concomitantly influence 
the behavior of a voter.   
Accordingly, some have shown that voters instead give critical attention to 
candidate profiles, important contextual issues such as gas nationalization, and 
governmental performance on economic and non-economic matters (Echegaray 2005, 
                                                 
6
 It is important to note that coca can be cultivated legally in some areas within the department of La Paz, 
but the response among coca growers has generally been tied to the Chaparé region in Cochabamba. 
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12).  Morales and MAS also gained notoriety during the protests and road blocks between 
the elections in 2002 and 2005 addressing issues like gas nationalization and coca 
cultivation in an indigenous context.  These protests have been framed as factors of 
economic justice and indigenous empowerment.  In a Washington Post article on October 
21, 2003, Carlos Uruieta, a painter and Aymara Indian, commented on the ousting of 
Sánchez de Lozada,  
I feel that the Aymara nation has exerted itself finally and stood up for its rights.  I feel 
that we are strong now and can never go back to being pushed around and ignored and 
neglected (Jeter 2003, A19).  
 
In January of 2003, prior to the fall of Sánchez de Lozada, Felipe Quispe and Morales 
united to protest the government‟s coca eradication policies.  These protests were 
significant because they united Quispe, an Aymara Indian, and Morales, representing the 
Quechua cocaleros (“Sucre Surrounded” 2005), two historically antagonistic actors.  
Introducing ethnic unity to the protests may have helped reinvigorate the “us versus 
them” mindset evident in the following quote by Quispe: “There is a racial battle between 
whites and indigenous people.  It is high time for us (indigenous Bolivians) to take 
power, that the invaders return our territory” (“Sucre Surrounded” 2005).  These events 
perhaps are, as Van Cott suggests, an expression of the indigenous identity (2006 181-
182).  The increasing importance of indigenous identity in Bolivia, therefore, must be 
scrutinized in light of the overwhelming victory of MAS in 2005 (Lazar and McNeish 
2006, 160; Albro 2005, 449). 
3.2 Economics, Geography, and Politics 
With the high correlation between the low quality of life indicators and 
indigenousness in Bolivia, scholars cannot help but speculate on the roots of indigenous 
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behavior.  Seymour Martin Lipset argues that states with stronger economies tend to be 
more democratic (1981, 31).  Bolivia has failed to achieve a high and sustained level of 
economic growth since its re-transition to democracy, which may underscore the reason 
for its political volatility (Whitehead 2001, 37-38).  Gary Reich finds that highly unstable 
electoral systems correlate with volatile economies (2004, 247).  We must consider the 
electoral performance of MAS to be a component of this political volatility, especially 
since the party‟s rise was so dramatic.  To be sure of the sources of MAS‟s successful 
performance in the presidential elections, we must examine the structural factors. 
To gain a complete understanding of the impacts of structural factors, we will 
need to examine three sets of variables.  First, it we need to address socio-economic 
variables from the analysis.  Conditions of poverty, inequality, unemployment, and poor 
education define the lives of many Bolivians, especially indigenous Bolivians.  It is fairly 
evident no Bolivian government has been able to effectively remedy these conditions.  
Second, we must address involvement in sectors of the economy which can be treated as 
a proxy measure of union involvement.  Labor unions can be quite powerful and in 
Bolivia their history is rich.  Third, we need to assess the role of departmental variation.  
As previously noted, Bolivia‟s nine departments are diverse in demographics and in 
resources.  These three sets of variables may together better explain the electoral 
performance of MAS in 2002 and in 2005, especially since these variables appear to 
highly correlate with indigenousness in Bolivia. 
3.2.1 Socio-Economic Factors and Politics   
Morales‟s rhetoric denouncing the neo-liberal privatization schemes and his 
demands for nationalizing the gas industry may indicate that the driving forces behind the 
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electoral successes of MAS in 2002 and in 2005 were ultimately economic in nature and 
not indigenous.  The economic liberalization policies, which were supposed to improve 
the Bolivian economy, served to increase the economic differences between dominant 
elites and the indigenous peoples (Gurr and Huff 1994, 78), and so we must be sure to 
include a measure of inequality as a possible explanatory variable.   
The social inequality demonstrated through the discrimination towards indigenous 
Bolivians has steadily diminished with time.  The Bolivian government has taken explicit 
measures to rectify this issue, like the constitutional amendment recognizing the 
indigenous peoples as ethnic minorities in the early 1990s.  Economic inequality, 
however, remains rampant and Cleary believes that the underlying reason for the strong 
support for MAS-like parties in Latin America is the high level of economic inequality 
(2006, 37-38).  Harmel and Robertson, however, counter this notion by finding that 
inequality does not appear to affect the emergence of left-of-center parties like MAS 
(1985, 514).  With conflicting assertions with regards to inequality, it is critical that we 
do not disregard the possibility that this variable may have had on the Bolivian electorate.  
Similarly electoral volatility has also been shown to correlate with other socio-economic 
variables that are worth considering for this analysis. 
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, among others, has been shown to be a 
significant variable in explaining electoral volatility
7
 (Roberts and Wibbels 1999, 583).  
Poverty is similarly useful.  Roberta Rice and Donna Lee Van Cott use a statistical 
analysis of sub-national units in several states in Latin America to find that both poverty 
                                                 
7
 Electoral volatility is defined as “…the change in vote shares obtained by individual parties in a given 
political system across consecutive elections…” (Roberts and Wibbels 1999, 576) 
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and indigenous population are significant predictors of indigenous party success (2006, 
725).  Persistent poverty, inequality, and low rates of GDP per capita may explain the 
electoral volatility in Bolivia as voters continuously punish incumbent parties.
8
  The 
explanatory power provided by poverty, inequality, and GDP per capita can be 
supplemented by variables such as employment and skills.  
We can posit that Bolivians, especially indigenous peoples, may be more likely to 
rise up when lack of employment is combined with a lack of resources for livelihoods.  
They may be restricted from certain areas of employment, like the service sector, due to a 
lack of necessary skills.  One of the biggest problems plaguing Bolivia, according 
Morales, is the concentration of land ownership.  The minimal access to land may 
reinforce the volatility caused by conditions of poverty.  In light of MAS‟s advocacy of 
the redistribution of idle lands to indigenous peoples (“Bolivian Opposition” 2005), it is 
reasonable to assume such a pledge could entice a voter to switch his or her party 
allegiance.  Problems arise when political parties are not aligned along ideological lines.  
With that, it may be difficult to generate an opinion the party system through one‟s 
individual experience, and so we must take into account the employment levels by 
economic sectors. 
3.2.2 Divisions by Economic Sector 
To exercise a right to vote requires knowledge of the party system.  Parties should 
be delineated across clear ideological lines.  This is not quite the case in Bolivia.  
Kenneth Roberts characterizes Bolivia‟s party system as one in which parties “…cut 
                                                 
8
 It is worth noting that the Bolivian constitution prevents candidates from serving two consecutive terms  
This does not mean that the same party could hold office in consecutive terms 
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vertically across class lines…” (2002, 9). As examined earlier, Bolivian political parties 
have not aligned themselves along class lines.  Their ideological boundaries are rather 
artificial and the parties have sustained their networks of support through corporatist 
practices (Roberts 2002, 9).  In Bolivian politics, labor unions have historically played an 
important role serving as intermediaries between the Bolivian campesinos and the 
political parties.  However, these unions declined in power with the economic collapse of 
the mid-1980s and the privatization schemes.  This left many Bolivians, especially 
indigenous Bolivians, with little access to political representatives.   
The proliferation of political activity in recent years seems to be a consequence of 
collapse in representation.  These protests seem to have crossed economic sector lines as 
we frequently see protests that combine miners, farmers, and other laborers uniting 
behind a collective call for economic justice.  MAS‟s outgrowth of the cocalero 
movement, which is effectively a labor movement of sorts, may have a special appeal to 
the working class in Bolivia because of the party‟s development from the ground up 
(Albro 2005, 438).  This would allow MAS to operate differently than the other parties as 
it has appealed along a highly collinear class and ethnic line.   
I believe that MAS derives most of its support from labor-intensive sectors of the 
economy, where there is often little stability or protection.  Involvement in private sector 
and commercial sector is more likely to drive the vote for MAS down considering MAS‟s 
preferences for centralized economic structures.  Employment in the public sector may 
also drive the vote for MAS down.  With a history of corruption, and the corporatist 
networks developed through the political parties, many Bolivian employees may feel an 
allegiance to the party in power.  The emergence of MAS may be threatening because of 
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the implicit implication that MAS officials will favor their loyal friends.  Thus, in the 
case of Bolivia, involvement in an economic sector can matter in elucidating a political 
line with MAS appealing to the labor and campesino communities.   
3.2.3 Departmental Differences and Politics 
Departmental differences may also play a role in explaining MAS‟s electoral 
performance in 2002 and in 2005.  The discovery of natural gas reserves in the late 1990s 
brought the promise of increased revenue for Bolivia, but these gas reserves are found 
only in Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, and Tarija, with the latter two departments 
occupying the highest concentration of reserves.  Santa Cruz and Tarija, in addition to the 
pro-business Pando and El Beni, have led the fight for departmental autonomy.  The 
argument here is they do not want to “foot the bill” for Bolivia.   
Regional inequality also highlights a source for MAS‟s success.  These four 
departments happen to have the lowest percentages of indigenous peoples, who typically 
live under higher levels of poverty, unemployment, and other characteristics detrimental 
the quality of life.  The following map shows the departments considered to be a part of 
the western highlands (Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro, and Potosi) to have the 
highest proportions of indigenous peoples as marked by the darker municipalities.  
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Figure 1. Distribution of Proportion of Indigenous Peoples by Department in Bolivia 
It would be logical, therefore, to presume that an indigenous Bolivian in La Paz would 
prefer the nationalization of the gas industry for an equitable distribution of the gas 
revenues.  The political support expressed for nationalization of the gas reserves, which 
may imply support for MAS, is effectively a response to the differences between the 
departments.  A person in La Paz may see the gas reserves in Santa Cruz as belonging to 
Bolivia, whereas a resident of Santa Cruz sees the gas as their own.  Perceptions of the 
issues are not standard across any state or polity.  The characteristics of each department 
provide a context to define the voters‟ perception of the important issues in Bolivia.   
El Beni 
Santa Cruz 
Pando 
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Ultimately, it is expected that indigenousness will have a minimal effect upon the 
propensity to vote for MAS in 2002 and 2005.  Indigenousness and the saliency of the 
ethnic identity in Bolivia are responses to the persistent socio-economic conditions and 
increased divide between the nine departments in Bolivia.  I expect that the socio-
economic indicators highlighting conditions such as poverty, inequality, and illiteracy, 
will demonstrate a positive relationship with the votes for MAS in the 2002 and 2005 
election.  I also believe that involvement in economic sectors will have a significant 
relationship with the votes for MAS in 2002 and in 2005 because behavioral alignment 
along such patterns is not rooted in the political culture of Bolivia.  I think departmental 
variation is especially critical in explaining the electoral performance of MAS in 2002 
and in 2005.  The variances in the nine departments provide a local context for broader 
issues that can have direct implications on voter behavior. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
This analysis examines the relationship between indigenousness and the 2002 and 
2005 presidential elections.  This analysis has thus far explored the relationship between 
the indigenous peoples and the emergence of Morales‟s party.  The next step is to 
empirically test this relationship to determine whether indigenousness matters in 
explaining the propensity to vote for MAS.     
To test these relationships, I collected election data from the Córte Nacional 
Electoral (CNE), the Bolivian electoral agency, for the 2002 and 2005 elections.  I also 
gathered demographic data, individual-level socio-economic data, employment by sector 
data, and departmental data from the 2000 census and other relevant reports from the 
Instituto Nacional Estadistical (INE), Bolivia‟s head statistical agency. I utilize an OLS 
regression treating the change in MAS support as the dependent variable and the 
demographic, socio-economic, associational, and geography as the independent variables.   
I will note that while I have structured this analysis around individual behavior, 
my approach to testing the questions occurs at an aggregated level.  This will introduce a 
level of error into my analysis, but since individual level data is difficult to come by, I 
must rely upon utilizing the municipal level data.  To be sure of my results, I would need 
to supplements this analysis with exhaustive interviews with Bolivians, indigenous and 
non-indigenous alike.  This analysis however provides initial insight into the perceived 
relationship between indigenous peoples and the electoral performance of Morales and 
generates future research questions.  The remainder of this chapter will cover how I 
proceeded with the data collection and operationalized the independent variables.   
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4.1 Election Data Collection 
 I collected election data from the (CNE) for the 2002 and 2005 elections.
9
  To do 
this, I linked to the 2005 election results webpage and selected Resultados por area 
geográfica (Results by Geographical Area).  I collected the election data at the Canton
10
 
level of aggregation, as shown in Figure 2 below, to match the level of aggregation of the 
majority of the socio-economic variables largely provided by the Bolivian census of 
2000.   
 
Figure 2. Screen shot of the CNE Webpage highlighting the Canton Level of Aggregation 
                                                 
9
 The election results were collected with the intention of highlighting the success of the Movimiento al 
Socialismo at the municipal level.  To collect the 2002 data, I visited CNE homepage (www.cne.org.bo) 
and linked to the 2002 results webpage.  The 2002 raw election results for MAS were available for 
collection by table, from smallest to largest, for eight of the nine departments.  These results were copied 
and pasted individually into a Microsoft Excel dataset.  The ninth department, Santa Cruz, was not 
available by department and so this data had to be collected by using the circunscripciones as the unit of 
analysis.  The circunscripciones 50 to 60 were the units that pertained to Santa Cruz, which allowed me to 
collect the table results for the tables associated with the department. 
10
 Referred to as municipalities in the rest of the analysis 
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The raw 2005 votes for MAS were collected and then transformed into percentages of the 
total vote of the municipality.   
 I next determined the geographic information for the 2002 election results, which 
were only provided at the mesa level as highlighted in Figure 3
11
.  To accomplish this, I 
used the webpage highlighted in Figure 3 to pool the mesas based upon like geography.  
This allowed for a cross-election analysis.   
Figure 3. Screen shot of the 2002 Election Results by Mesa 
4.2 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables in this analysis are the MAS votes in 2002 and in 2005.  
To operationalize this variable, I calculated the proportion of MAS votes at the municipal 
level for each election.   
% MAS 2005 = Votes for MAS at the Municipal Level / Total Votes in the Municipality 
% MAS 2002 = Votes for MAS at the Municipal Level / Total Votes for the Municipality 
                                                 
11
 Mesa is the smallest level of aggregation for the election results.  In this case, mesa would translate to 
voting booth 
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I elected to treat the dependent variables as a proportion to allow for a more uniform 
analysis of the results across Bolivia.  If the regression utilized the raw number of votes 
for MAS, we would capture the size of the different municipalities, which is something I 
wish to avoid in this analysis.   
4.3 Independent Variables
12
 
The independent variables for this analysis were determined through an 
exhaustive literature review examining the indigenous movements and emergence of 
MAS in Bolivia.  This group of variables is aggregated into four separate groups: 
IV1: Demographics 
IV2: Individual-level Socio-economic Variables 
IV3: Employment by Sector 
IV4: Departmental Variables 
These variables represent four areas of influence.  The first variable is dynamic 
characteristic of political actors.  The second variable describes the social and economic 
conditions that may affect the behavior of political actors.  The third variable is a pseudo 
measure of association, which allows for speculation on possible bloc behavior through 
labor groups.  The last variable is the highest level of aggregation which allows us to 
control for regional differences and spatial questions regarding shared border. 
Most of the data collected for the independent variables came from the 2000 
census reports published in 2001.  These reports, published by the INE, provide a 
comprehensive overview of demographic, social, and economic characteristics for the 
municipalities in Bolivia‟s nine departments.  Several of the variables were collected 
                                                 
12
 For expanded descriptions of the independent variables, see Appendix 2 
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from other statistical reports produced by published the INE and one variable, presence of 
coca cultivation, was determined through a report published by the United Nations.  
These data create an opportunity for an empirical analysis of the relationship between 
MAS support and indigenous identity. 
4.3.1 Demographics 
 I utilize populations identifying as indigenous and as not-indigenous at the 
municipal level to operationalize the demographic variable.  I include both measures for 
comparison purposes under the belief that similar behavior by both groups indicate that 
indigenousness does not matter.  The data available for people who identify as indigenous 
and as not-indigenous was available for a population of 4 years of age and up and 15 
years of age and up.  I utilized the 15+ years variable to come as close as possible to 
capturing the voting populace, which starts at 18 years of age.  While this may introduce 
some error, it is the closest measure available.   
I measure indigenousness in a municipality as the proportion of indigenous 
peoples.  The proportion of indigenous peoples at the municipal level is calculated as 
% Indigenous = (Number of People 15 Years of Age and Older who Identify as Indigenous) / (Total 
Number of Residents 15 Years of Age and Older in the Municipality) 
I employ the same formula for non-indigenous population.  Data is also available for the 
disaggregated indigenous populations, and by utilizing the formula above we can 
additionally test for the relationship between the distinct groups in Bolivia and the 
propensity to vote for MAS.  These proportional variables allow for the standardization 
of indigenousness and non-indigenous across the municipalities. 
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4.3.2 Structural Variables 
 It is critical we control for the set of variables associated with socio-economic 
conditions when testing the relationship between indigenousness and the electoral 
performance of MAS.  I operationalize this variable at the municipal level in several 
ways.  I first control for percent poverty, which is measured as the percent of the 
population below the poverty line.  MAS has presented itself as a leftist party and there is 
a relatively strong correlation between poverty and indigenous peoples, therefore, it is 
important that we control for poverty in this analysis.  Second, I control for percent 
illiteracy, which measures the prevalence of illiteracy in each municipality.  I treat this as 
a proxy measure of skills, which can carry implications in terms of employment 
opportunities.  Third, I control for percent unemployment for each municipality.  This is 
measured as the working population, designated at ten years of age per the Bolivian 
census, and is looking for work.  Fourth, I control for lack of home ownership, which is 
the proportion of the residents in the municipality who do not own a home.  Home 
ownership is an attempt to capture status.  Fifth, I included GDP per capita, measured at 
the municipal level as measures of economic status.  Finally, I include a GINI coefficient 
as a measure of inequality for each municipality. 
 I operationalize percent employment by sector at the municipal level by 
including several areas of the economy, including agriculture, mining, industry, public 
utilities, commercial sector, public sector, the transportation sector, and the construction 
sector.  I also incorporate coca cultivation into this.  The coca crop plays an integral role 
in the livelihoods of many indigenous Bolivians, and is a critical policy issue for MAS.  
The municipalities where coca is cultivated, as determined from the United Nations 
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Office on Drugs and Crime: Bolivia Coca Cultivation Survey, were coded with a dummy 
variable.  It is critical to control for what may be construed as a labor response in favor of 
MAS, especially considering the contextual importance of labor movements in Bolivia.     
In this last set of variables, I employ several controls for the regional differences.  
I first operatonalized this by coding dummy variables for each of the nine departments to 
control for regional variation in terms of foreign direct investment, borders, gas reserves 
and other sources of variation.  This data should allow for a clear and coherent analysis of 
the 2002 and 2005 presidential elections.  The data available for the independent 
variables is slightly limiting since much of it measures information collected back in 
2000, prior to both elections.  However, I feel that it is safe to say that Bolivia has not 
changed significantly in the span of five years, allowing for a safe and reliable analysis.    
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Chapter 5: Results and Discussion 
 The main purpose of this analysis was to examine the relationship between 
indigenousness and MAS votes in the 2002 and the 2005 elections.  MAS‟s surprise 
performance in the 2002 election and unprecedented victory in 2005 suggest that MAS is 
special or unique to Bolivian politics.  From these two elections, I asked one primary and 
three supplemental questions regarding the relationship between MAS‟s electoral 
performance in 2002 and 2005.  The primary question examines the MAS‟s performance 
and its relation to indigenousness.  I also examine the party‟s performance and its 
relationship with socio-economic indicators, involvement in economic sectors, and 
departmental variation.  To test the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 1, I conducted several 
regressions utilizing the aforementioned variables.  Overall, the results support the notion 
that indigenousness does not increase the likelihood of a vote for MAS. 
 In the first regression, I first examine the relationship between indigenousness and 
MAS votes in 2002 and again in the 2005 elections and second between MAS 
performance and socio-economic indicators, involvement in economic sectors, and 
departmental variation.  In the first sets of regressions, I use Percent Identify as 
Indigenous and Percent Do Not Identify as Indigenous to examine the differences in the 
indigenous and non-indigenous behavior.  I employ the socio-economic variables, percent 
involvement by each economic sector and the departmental dummy variables as control 
variables.  In my second regression, I switch the measure of the involvement by 
economic sector from a proportional measure to a raw measure.  In my third and fourth 
regressions I use a disaggregated measure of indigenousness by employing Percent 
Identify as Aymara, Percent Identify as Quechua, and Percent Identify as Other, in 
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addition to Percent Do Not Identify as Indigenous for the demographic variables.  The 
difference between the third and fourth regressions is the same difference utilized 
between the first and second regressions.  In all four of the regressions I elect to drop the 
department of Pando, which has the smallest proportion of indigenous peoples, to allow 
for the comparison between the indigenous and non-indigenous populations.  The 
following discussion is structured around the hypotheses postulated above.  I will discuss 
the regression analyses for each regression, the decision to be made on the hypothesis, 
and the implications for the results.
13
   
5.1 Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis stated: There is no relationship between the proportions of 
indigenous peoples in a municipality and the votes for MAS in 2002 and 2005.  To test 
this, I employed indigenousness as an aggregate measure and as a disaggregated measure 
at the municipal level.  In the first and second regressions I treat indigenous as an 
aggregate variable.  In the first regression, Percent Identify as Indigenous performs the 
same way as Percent Do Not Identify as Indigenous for both elections.  Both variables 
show up as positive for both elections, but fail to show up as statistically significant 
(p<0.05).  In the second regression, I find the same results.  Percent Identify as 
Indigenous and Percent Do Not Identify as Indigenous both came out to be positive and 
statistically insignificant (p<0.05).  In the third regression, I disaggregate the Percent 
Identify as Indigenous variable to Percent Aymara, Percent Quechua, and Percent Other.  
The demographic variables continue to be insignificant (p<0.05).  All the variables were 
positive in their result.  Percent Aymara and Percent Quechua were more significant than 
                                                 
13
 The regression outputs are attached in Appendices 3, 4, 5, and 6 
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Percent Other and Percent Do Not Identify as Indigenous in both elections, but were not 
statistically significant.  In the fourth regression, I find the disaggregated demographic 
variables to be positive, but still statistically insignificant. 
 Model 1  
2005 
Model 1 
2002 
Model 2 
2005 
Model 2 
2002 
Model 3 
2005 
Model 3 
2002 
Model 4 
2005 
Model 4 
2002 
%ID as 
Indigenous 
.208(.332) .131 (.439) .242 (.268) .0969 (.578)     
%ID as Non 
Indigenous 
.146 (.464) .083 (.599) .181 (.372) .0283 (.861) .232 (.250) .082 
(.611) 
.152 
(.444) 
.106 
(.503) 
%Aymara     .434 (.055) .228 
(.204) 
.344 
(.118) 
.378 
(.171) 
%Quechua     .394 (.085) .252 
(.168) 
.319 
(.157) 
.264 
(.138) 
%Other     .156 (.473) .0403 
(.816) 
.075 
(.729) 
.033 
(.842) 
Rsquare .426 .493 .427 .489 0.45 .50 0.44 0.51 
N 311 313 311 313 311 313 311 313 
Table 1. Results for Tests on Indigenousness 
 
The results of the regressions therefore suggests that indigenousness does not 
affect the propensity to vote for MAS in 2002 and 2005 any differently than the 
population that does not identify as indigenous.  This finding suggests that another story 
needs to be told to explain the dramatic ascension of MAS, first in 2002 and then in 2005.  
The next three hypotheses test for this and the associated results may shed light on the 
real source of this electoral rise. 
5.2 Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 stated:   There is no relationship between the socio-economic 
conditions pointing to a lower quality of life in a municipality and the votes for MAS in 
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2002 and 2005.  When testing for the first hypothesis, I incorporated several socio-
economic control variables.  I monitored the interaction of these variables through the 
four regressions conducted.  In the first regression, only Percent illiteracy shows up as 
statistically significant (0.234, p<0.05) in 2002.  None of the other socio-economic 
variables how up as statistically significant.  Surprisingly, Inequality generates a negative 
coefficient in both the 2002 and the 2005 elections.  In the second regression, none of the 
socio-economic variables came up as statistically significant (p<0.05) for either election.  
Inequality continued to have a negative coefficient in both elections.  In the third 
regression, none of the socio-economic control variables show up as statistically 
significant (p<0.05) for either election.  Inequality continued to have a negative 
coefficient.  In the 2002 election, GDP per capita also had a negative coefficient.  In the 
last regression, none of the socio-economic variables showed up as statistically 
significant (p<0.05).  Inequality continued to have a negative coefficient.  GDP per 
capita, like the third regression, had a negative coefficient for the 2002 election. 
The failures of the socio-economic variables to show up as statistically significant 
and so we fail to reject the null hypothesis that higher levels would generate higher levels 
of MAS support.  This portion of the story is intriguing as it defies the expectation of 
voters acting upon their socio-economic status.  Thus far, we have failed to explain the 
possible sources of MAS‟s electoral success in 2002 and in 2005. 
5.3 Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis states: There is no relationship between employment in a 
sector of the economy in a municipality and the votes for MAS in 2002 and 2005.  In the 
first regression, we only find one variable, Percent Involved in Construction, to be 
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statistically significant (-.643, p<0.01), albeit in a negative direction.  Percent Mining, 
Percent Industry, Percent Public Utilities, Percent Construction, Percent Commercial, and 
Percent Public Sector were all found to have negative coefficients in either 2005.  Only 
Percent Construction and Percent Public Sector had negative coefficients in 2002.  In the 
second regression, none of the variables, measured as the total involvement in the sector 
of the economy, came up as statistically significant (p<0.05).  Total Mining (2002), Total 
Industry (2002, 2005), Total Public Utilities (2005), Total Construction (2002, 2005), and 
Total Public Sector (2002, 2005) were found to have negative coefficients.  In the third 
regression, utilizing the same measurement of the variables as regression two, we 
continue to find none of the variables as statistically significant.  Many of the same 
variables generated the same coefficients as the previous regressions.  In the fourth 
regression, we again find Percent Construction to be statistically significant (-.699, 
p<0.01), albeit in a negative direction.  None of the other variables were statistically 
significant (p<0.05).  When treating Coca as an economic sector variable, we find that it 
comes up statistically significant in all four regressions in the 2002 election (p<.000), but 
fails to come up statistically significant in 2005. 
 Evaluating this hypothesis, then, we fail to reject the null hypothesis.  
Involvement in an economic sector, labor intensive or not, does not appear to affect the 
tendency to vote for MAS in the 2002 election or in the 2005 election.  The next section 
discusses the results pertaining to the fourth hypothesis.   
5.4 Hypothesis 4 
The fourth hypothesis states: There is no relationship between the location by 
department of voters and the votes for MAS in 2002 and 2005.  This variable appears to 
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have an effect upon the propensity to vote for MAS in the 2002 and 2005 elections.  In 
the first regression, Cochabamba (0.273, p<.000) and Potosi (.204, p<0.01) come up as 
positive and significant for the 2002 election.  In 2005, Chuquisaca (.238, p<0.05), 
Cochabamba (.306, p<.000), La Paz (.228, p<0.01), Oruro (.252, p<0.01), and Potosi 
(.247, p<0.01) all show up as positive and statistically significant.  Among the remaining 
departments, El Beni and Tarija had a negative coefficient in the 2002 and 2005 
elections. 
 Regression two also shows Potosi (.018, p<0.05) and Cochabamba (.236, 
p<0.000) to be positive and significant in the 2002 election.  In the 2005 election, we find 
the Chuquisaca (.230, p<0.05), Cochabamba (.304, p<.000), La Paz (.219, p<0.01), Oruro 
(.240, p<0.01), and Potosi (.24, p<0.01) to be positive and significant.  El Beni and Tarija 
both had negative coefficients in 2002 and in 2005.  Santa Cruz and La Paz also 
generated negative coefficients for the 2002 elections.  In the third regression, we see a 
decrease in the number of significant departments.  Only Cochabamba comes up both 
positive and significant in the 2002 and 2005 elections.  El Beni and Tarija continue to 
generate negative coefficients in both elections.  Chuquisaca, La Paz and Santa Cruz also 
generate negative coefficients in 2002.  In the fourth regression, we again see 
Cochabamba come up significant in the 2002 elections (0.195, p<0.01), but not in the 
2005 elections.  Chuquisaca (.204, p< 0.05) is the only department to come up significant 
in the 2005 election.  El Beni and Tarija continue to generate negative coefficients across 
both elections.   
 Based on these regression results, we can reject the null hypothesis.  The variation 
between departments appears to have made a difference in the tendency of Bolivians to 
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vote for MAS.  We consistently saw Cochabamba come up as statistically significant.  
We also saw El Beni and Tarija generate negative coefficients.  Although they are not 
statistically significant, the negative coefficient may be a telling sign that something 
deeper is going on within the department.  In the first regression, we saw a clear divide 
between the departments along what I described earlier as the western highlands and 
eastern lowlands.  The central concern of this analysis, however, was to determine the 
relationship between MAS votes in 2002 and in 2005 and indigenousness. 
5.5 Robustness Tests 
These aggregate level regressions suggest that indigenousness does not seem to 
matter in voting for MAS when compared to the non-indigenous population.  Before 
accepting these results, I conducted several additional regressions at the national level 
and for the nine departments.  In the first set of robustness tests, I run Percent Identify as 
Indigenous, Percent Do Not Identify as Indigenous, the socio-economic indicators, and 
involvement by economic sector for each of the nine departments.
14
  The results, found in 
Appendix 7, support the idea that indigenousness does not seem to affect the propensity 
to vote for Morales in either the 2002 or the 2005 presidential elections.  In none of the 
nine departments do Percent Identify as Indigenous or Percent Do Not Identify as 
Indigenous come up as statistically significant.  In the second test, I conduct a similar 
analysis but disaggregate the indigenous variable into Percent Quechua, Percent Aymara, 
and Percent Other.  Upon disaggregating this variable we find that indigenousness 
appears to matter in a few of the departments.
15
  In Cochabamba, Percent Quechua (1.18, 
                                                 
14
 The regression output for the nine departments is found in Appendix 7 
15
 See Appendix 8 for these complete results 
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p<0.01 in 2005; 1.01, p<0.05 in 2002) is significant in both the 2005 and 2002 
presidential elections.  In Santa Cruz, Percent Quechua is also significant in the 2005 
(0.55, p<0.05) and the 2002 (0.71, p<0.001) presidential elections.  The only other 
department where indigenousness comes up significant is in Tarija where both Percent 
Aymara (0.33, p<0.001 in 2005; 0.19, p<0.001 in 2002) and Percent Quechua (0.39, 
p<0.001 in 2005; 0.41, p<0.001 in 2002) come up as being significant.  These results 
immediately force us to question the results found in Appendices 3, 4, 5, and 6.  To 
further test for robustness, I conduct six more regressions with three operationalizing the 
demographic variable as Percent Identify as Indigenous and the second three 
disaggregating the indigenous variable into Percent Aymara, Percent Quechua, and 
Percent Other.  I also drop Percent Do Not Identify as Indigenous and include all nine 
departments which differ from the initial four regressions.  
In these regressions I employ different combinations of the socio-economic 
variables to reduce the high collinearity introduced by utilizing all of the socio-economic 
variables together.  In the first regressions, found Appendix 9a and 9b, I utilize Percent 
No Home Ownership, Percent Employment, and Percent Poverty.  I find that Percent 
Identify as Indigenous does not come up as significant.  However, when I disaggregate 
this into the three indigenous groups both Percent Quechua (0.196, p<0.05) and Percent 
Aymara (0.189, p<0.05) show up significant in 2005.  In 2002, only Percent Quechua 
(0.171, p<0.05) shows up statistically significant.
16
  Interestingly, Percent Other has a 
negative coefficient for both the 2002 and 2005 elections.   
                                                 
16
 The results for this regression are found in Appendix 9b 
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In the second set of regressions, found in Appendix 10a and 10b, I add Inequality 
to the four socio-economic measures in the previous two regressions.  In the first 
regression, Percent Identify as Indigenous fails to come up as statistically significant.  In 
the second regression, however, Percent Quechua (0.196, p<0.05) and Percent Aymara 
(0.189, p<0.05) are significant in the 2005 election, and Percent Quechua (0.171, p<0.05) 
is significant in the 2002 election.  In both of these regressions, we again find that Percent 
Other has a negative coefficient for the 2002 and 2005 elections. 
In the third set of regressions, found in Appendices 11a and 11b, I only utilize 
Percent Employment and Inequality in addition to all the economic sector variables and 
all nine departments.  In the first regression, Percent Identify as Indigenous fails to show 
up as statistically significant.  In the second regression, however, Percent Aymara (0.191, 
p<0.05) is significant in 2005 but only Percent Quechua (0.16, p<0.05) is significant in 
2002.  Percent Other again has a negative coefficient. 
 The findings offer support for the initial hypothesis that indigenousness does not 
increase the propensity for MAS votes.  In all nine departments, Percent Identify as 
Indigenous and Percent do Not Identify as Indigenous performed in a similar manner.  
When disaggregating the indigenous variable, we find it is only significant in La Paz, 
Tarija, and Santa Cruz.  In the additional robustness tests I find that Percent Identify as 
Indigenous fails to show up as significant.  Percent Aymara and Percent Quechua, 
however, do show up as statistically significant in several regressions and Percent Other, 
though not significant, has a negative coefficient.  These regressions have shed light on 
the indigenousness and its relationship to the MAS votes in the 2002 and 2005 elections.  
  
44 
The mixed results generated from the above regressions highlight the need for an analysis 
and discussion of the results and for future research. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Research 
This analysis has discussed the role of indigenousness and the propensity to vote 
for MAS in the 2002 and 2005 presidential elections.  The results suggest that the 
relationship between the indigenous peoples and the electoral performance of Morales 
and MAS is not as clear as initially believed.  I additionally find that socio-economic 
indicators do not explain political behavior in a way that would be expected.  We find 
little evidence that involvement in an economic sector, aside from coca, generates higher 
levels of support for MAS in 2002 and 2005.  Several departments consistently showed 
up as statistically significant, indicating that departmental variation can generate different 
levels of support for MAS.   
 The failure of indigenousness to show up statistically significant is an important 
finding.  The presumption that the movement to elect Evo Morales was a predominantly 
indigenousness has been challenged by the results.  When treated as a single 
demographic, indigenousness does not seem to affect the propensity to vote for MAS.  
When I disaggregate the results, however, the differences between the indigenous groups 
become apparent.  These differing results should not be surprising as Bolivia‟s 
indigenous groups are ethnically and geographically distinct.   
The following table highlights the geographical concentration of the indigenous 
peoples.   
Department %Quechua %Aymara %Other 
Chuquisaca 0.61 0.01 0.03 
Cochabamba 0.60 0.06 0.01 
El Beni 0.03 0.04 0.25 
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La Paz 0.08 0.68 0.01 
Oruro 0.35 0.37 0.01 
Pando 0.04 0.05 0.07 
Potosi 0.77 0.06 0.004 
Santa Cruz 0.17 0.04 0.17 
Tarija 0.12 0.03 0.05 
Table 2. Percent Indigenous by Department 
 
As we can see above, the Quechua tend to dominate Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, Oruro, 
and Potosi whereas the Aymara tend to be concentrated in La Paz and Oruro.  The 
remaining indigenous groups are typically concentrated in the departments of El Beni and 
Santa Cruz.  When we examine the robustness tests examining the nine departments with 
a disaggregated indigenous variable, we find that indigenousness appears to matter in 
Cochabamba, Tarija, and Santa Cruz.  In Cochabamba, we can expect the Quechua to 
vote for MAS with greater frequency due to MAS‟s roots in the department.  The results 
in Tarija and Santa Cruz, however, are surprising.  With the highest concentration of 
indigenous peoples at 17% in Santa Cruz, we can say that in comparison to the 
departments with high concentrations of indigenous peoples, these two departments stand 
out for their results.  This may be explained by a variety of factors.  I do not believe, 
however, that it is explained by an increased saliency in indigenous identity.  El Beni and 
Pando have smaller indigenous populations yet failed to show up statistically significant.  
This result may perhaps be explained the several geographical factors that are discussed 
below. 
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The results also suggest that the idea that the socio-economic variables and 
employment by economic sector were conflated with the indigenousness variable appears 
to misleading.  It was somewhat surprising that the socio-economic factors and 
employment by economic sector did not show up statistically significant, as I had initially 
predicted.  Intuitively, one would expect that a poor Bolivian would vote for a leftist 
leader, such as Morales.  Upon closer examination, we can see why the results that did 
turn up are not surprising.  The following Table highlights the distribution of poverty 
throughout Bolivia‟s nine departments. 
Department Percent Poverty 
Chuquisaca 82.4% 
Cochabamba 67.7% 
El Beni 74.4% 
La Paz 73.2% 
Oruro 72.8% 
Pando 65% 
Potosi 83.1% 
Santa Cruz 61.7% 
Tarija 71.3% 
Table 3. Percent Poverty by Department 
 
As we see above, Cochabamba, the perceived “home” of MAS, has a lower poverty level 
of Tarija and El Beni, both strong anti-MAS departments.  There is no clear pattern 
between the proportion of the population below the poverty level and the support for 
MAS at the departmental levels.  Consequently, socio-economic conditions of Bolivia 
may not drive a widespread response in favor of a candidate like Morales.  The 
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symptomatic nature of socio-economic conditions indicates the need for policies to 
remedy these conditions.  The candidate that provides a new plan of action, like 
Morales‟s desire to nationalize the gas industry, may be more likely to win over new 
voters, but poor socio-economic conditions, while they can be debilitating, are not 
necessarily uniting.  Poverty, for example, is widespread in Bolivia, as we see in Table 3 
above, but we do not see a “poverty bloc” acting in unison over economic and policy 
issues.  Poverty is a problem needs to be addressed but differences arise over how this 
should be done.  These differences introduce politics into the sphere of engagement over 
the socio-economic conditions.  Different groups will support different policies for the 
solutions to elevating the quality of life.  Poverty and other like socio-economic 
conditions, by themselves, are not sufficient for explaining the propensity to vote for 
MAS.   
 The second set of variables, employment by economic sector, also failed to show 
up as statistically significant.  Treating this as a proxy measure for association, I am 
slightly surprised that none of the economic sectors showed up as statistically significant.  
Employment in any economic sector does not necessarily imply political activity that 
addresses the needs and concerns of that sector.  To aggregate a sector and treat it as a 
homogenous variable is dangerous because of competing ideologies.  As we saw with the 
socio-economic variables, many different beliefs about the government‟s approach to the 
economy will affect participants in different economic sectors in different ways.  Perhaps 
a better variable to include would have been union membership at the municipal level.  
Unions are political tools of economic sectors whereby workers can politically advance 
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their causes.  Union membership and employment by sector may not capture the same 
variable, and so it is important we are cautious of the results.    
The statistical significance of the departmental variables was to be expected 
because of the variation found between the departments.  The story told by this set of 
variables, however, is compelling.  The multicultural and structural reforms of the 1990s 
created opportunities for geographically concentrated groups to contend for political 
power (Albro 2005, 435).  The rise of MAS prior to the 2002 election exemplifies this as 
the party rose out of the Quechua cocalero movement (Albro 2005, 436-438) 
concentrated in Cochabamba.  This perhaps explains the regularity in which both coca 
and Cochabamba would show up as statistically significant.  One cannot deny the 
centrality of coca to MAS and Morales‟s campaigns, especially in the 2002 election.  The 
concentration of Quechua cocaleros, however, is not a sufficient explanation for 
explaining the ascension of MAS out of Cochabamba.  The variation among departments 
transcends concentrations of ethnic groups.  The nine departments seem to operate in two 
blocs, based upon the pattern of votes given for MAS.  It is critical we address these bloc 
variations and the relationship to the indigenous peoples.     
 One way to examine departmental variation is to consider geography and borders.  
Bolivia has a historically antagonistic relationship with Chile dating back to the Chaco 
War in the 1800s.  Bolivia erupted in protests when Sánchez de Lozada announced the 
exportation of Bolivian gas through Chile.  When examining the relationship between a 
common border with Chile and MAS votes, I find the correlation to increase between the 
2002 and 2005 election and proximity to Chile, as highlighted in Table 4 below.   
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 Chile FDI Gas 
2002 MAS 0.10 -0.22 -0.14 
2005 MAS 0.31 -0.22 -0.28 
Table 4. Correlation Plots for MAS Votes 
 
This correlation jump may tell us several things.  First, following the decision to export 
gas through Chile, many Bolivians near the Chilean border changed their policy 
preferences to support a party that would not execute such a policy.  It could also mean 
that gas was so central to the 2005 Bolivian election due to the fresh memory of the 
tumultuous gas war.   
A second approach to examining the spatial relationship between departments and 
MAS votes is to look at the variation in the distribution of resources.  Table 4 shows that 
the correlation between average foreign direct investment and MAS votes is consistent, 
but clearly negative over the 2002 and 2005 elections.  The more foreign direct 
investment (FDI) received in a department, the less likely the department was to go in 
MAS‟s favor.  This is also a very important find to the study of the ascension of MAS.  
Residents in El Beni or Tarija, which consistently showed a negative relationship with 
MAS votes, may fear the rise of MAS because of the possible loss of FDI.  MAS‟s 
proposed policies of nationalization and economic centralization may scare off foreign 
investors.  This would generate an unfavorable outcome for these departments.  
Departments with less FDI, however, may appreciate MAS‟s economic approaches, 
especially with the economic redistribution promises.   
Along the same lines as FDI, if we examine the correlation between gas reserves 
and MAS votes in 2002 and 2005, we see the correlation rate double as shown in Table 4 
  
51 
above.  Relating back to the previous discussion on the importance of gas reserves, 
Bolivian voters may have voted on the idea that the gas reserves are for Bolivia.  While 
my regressions have shown that socio-economic indicators do not seem to be a factor in 
the votes for MAS, these conditions may color the perception of gas.  We can expect a 
Bolivian located in a gas department to claim sovereignty over the reserves.  A voter in a 
non-gas department, however, may perceive gas as belonging to the state.  This logic is 
slightly flawed since gas reserves are found in the departments of Chuquisaca and 
Cochabamba, which were both supporters of MAS.  The heavy concentration of gas 
reserves and high levels of FDI probably reinforced the ideas of departmental sovereignty 
driving anti-MAS inclinations in the departments where MAS is weakest.    
We must also keep in mind the spatial relationship between indigenous peoples 
and departments.  As highlighted in Figure 1, the pro-business and gas-rich states also 
tend to have lower indigenous populations.  Thus, what appears to be an indigenous 
propensity to vote for MAS is not actually the case.  Indigenous and non-indigenous 
Bolivians behave in the same way.  What conditions their behavior is the context of 
distribution and access to resources.  These findings carry implications for other future 
studies whereby significant political shifts have occurred over regional variation or the 
distribution of resources.  It is important that we begin supplementing the current 
literature on the political developments of Bolivia and test my findings on similar stories 
to examine possible apparent trends. 
  In studying the rise of MAS, we are inclined to extrapolate our findings into the 
trends of Latin America and beyond.  At face value, it appears that the hard left is 
reemerging in Latin America.  We have seen political uprisings and ascension into power 
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in areas of Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, and most evidently in Venezuela with Hugo 
Chavez.  We also have conflicts in Sudan, where we often hear about an Arab Muslim 
versus a Black Christian conflicts, or in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Are these 
conflicts, uprisings, and electoral ascensions due to ideology and identity?  I believe if we 
applied the same approach to studying these issues as I have outlined above, we would 
find similar results.  The Sudanese conflict, for example, is colored by oil resources and 
Chinese investment.  In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we need to understand the roles of 
water and land resources.  These findings raise important points regarding studies of 
political shifts. 
We as political actors are conditioned by our surroundings to respond in certain 
ways.  These responses are often outside of the democratic realm.  Morales, prior to the 
election in 2005, effectively had the country wrapped around his finger.  Widespread 
protests would often erupt with his demands for gas nationalization and changed 
leadership.  Bolivians, however, were not responding to Morales.  They were responding 
to an articulation of ideas that addressed structural issues, like gas, in which they saw as 
being very relevant to their lives.  The question then becomes what sorts of resource 
variables highly correlate with this support?  The qualitative descriptions of Bolivian 
politics, the indigenous movements, and the rise of MAS have suggested possible 
variables, and through this analysis I have been able to test these notions.  I think this 
analysis has shown that many previous assertions about the importance of poor 
indigenous peoples being critical to the rise of MAS may be exaggerated.   
The last point that needs to be made is that we cannot understand the politics of a 
place like Bolivia without understanding the historical relationships of the past.  To deny 
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the past is to deny the realities of today.  The elites in Bolivia systematically oppressed 
the indigenous peoples for centuries.  While Bolivia was one of the earlier states in Latin 
America to grant citizenship rights to indigenous peoples, this only occurred in 1952.  
Perhaps with the rise of MAS and Evo Morales, the indigenous peoples finally feel 
politically enfranchised.  This does not mean, however, that it is their indigenous story 
and historical oppression that explains their support for MAS.  What history can tell us is 
that this demographic has been systematically denied political and economic power for 
centuries.  This denial has created a fragmented state that is defined by widespread 
regional inequality.  This regional variation creates patterns of political behavior, which 
is conditioned by the resources available to the department and to the residents of the 
department. 
In my thesis, I have questioned the relationship between the electoral performance 
of MAS and the indigenousness of the Bolivian electorate.  I have similarly shown that 
conditions like poverty and inequality are do not affect the rise of MAS in the way we 
would expect.  The variations between the departments, as shared in the correlation 
results above, reveal some explanatory power.  My results have generated new questions 
about resources and geography and their impacts on politics.  We need to further explore 
the reasons that both indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians support Evo Morales.  We 
can also supplement this analysis but conducting exhaustive interviews to better 
understand regional differences and the factors that color these perceptions.  Further 
research on where MAS dedicated their campaign resources would also benefit this 
analysis to understand the significance of indigenousness in Santa Cruz and Tarija, two 
anti-MAS departments.  We could also utilize spatial analyses to understand how 
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predominantly indigenous communities surrounded by like communities behave 
politically and compare these with communities surrounded by dissimilar municipalities.  
The notion that the indigenousness affected the propensity to vote for MAS is not as clear 
as we have been made to believe.  I have shown that indigenous and non-indigenous 
Bolivians alike tended to operate in similar ways.  We also find that the indigenous 
peoples in Bolivia, when treated as distinct units, do not behave as a unified bloc.  The 
remaining indigenous Bolivians, when compared to the Aymara and the Quechua 
peoples, tend to behave differently.  We need to further explore these questions to better 
understand the possible explanations for the volatility of Bolivian politics and begin 
testing these findings in other areas of the world with high political volatility.  
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Appendix 1 MAS Ten Point Plan 
1. To promote a Constituent Assembly to expand the representation in government 
2. To promote the nationalization of the gas reserves 
3. To promote the self-governance of Departments within federal regulation 
4. To promote the creation of two development banks for the purpose of fighting poverty 
5. To promote the fight against corruption and mismanaged in government 
6. To promote the reduction of the fiscal deficit 
7. To promote the distribution of land to guarantee agricultural and livestock production 
8. To promote the fight against crime  
9. To promote food sovereignty programs to reduce reliance upon other states 
10. To promote the transformation of education 
 
Source: “Bolivian Opposition Party Presents 10-Point Government Plan.”  Financial Times Information 
Oct. 13, 2005. Online. LexisNexis Academic, 10 June 2007. 
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Appendix 2 Independent Variables 
Percent Identify as Indigenous: Percent of the population, 15 years and older, who identify as indigenous in 
a municipality in 2000 
 
Percent Identify as Aymara: Percent of the population, 15 years and older, who identify as an Aymara 
Indian in a municipality in 2000 
 
Percent Identify as Quechua: Percent of the population, 15 years and older, who identify as a Quechua 
Indian in a municipality in 2000 
 
Percent Identify as Other: Percent of the population, 15 years and older, who identify as Guarani, 
Chiquitano, or Other groups in a municipality in 2000 
 
Percent Do Not Identify as Indigenous: Percent of the population, 15 years and older, who do not identify 
as Indigenous in 2000 
 
Percent Poverty: Percent of the population whose earnings and assets fall below the poverty line in a 
municipality in 2000 
 
Illiteracy: Percent of the population, 15 years and older who do not know how to read or write in a 
municipality in 2000 
 
Percent Employed: Percent of the working age population, set at 10 years of age or higher, that is employed 
in a municipality in 2000 
 
Percent No Home Ownership: Percent of the population in a municipality that own their own home in 2000 
 
GDP Per Capita: Gross Domestic Product, per capita, for each municipality in 2000 
 
Inequality: Gini coefficient; measure of the unequal distribution of income in 2000 
 
Departments: Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, El Beni, La Paz, Oruro, Potosi, Santa Cruz, Tarija  
 
Coca: Presence of coca agriculture sites, both legal and illegal, as shared by the United Nations  
 
Involvement in Economic Sectors: Measured as the number or proportion of Bolivians starting from the 
working age of 10 years employed in the following sectors: Agriculture, Mining, Industrial Sector, Public 
Utilities, Construction, Commercial, Transportation and Communication, Public Sector 
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Appendix 3 Regression One Results 
  
 %MAS 2005  %MAS 2002  
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Percent Identify as Indigenous 0.208 0.332 0.131 0.439 
Percent Not Identify as 
Indigenous 
0.146 0.464 0.083 0.599 
Percent Poverty 0.140 0.504 0.034 0.840 
Percent Illiteracy 0.268 0.076 0.234* 0.049 
Percent Employment 0.012 0.638 0.009 0.669 
Percent No Home Ownership 0.076 0.669 0.012 0.930 
GDP Per Capita 4.62E-05 0.548 -3.69E-05 0.544 
Inequality -0.161 0.414 -0.032 0.837 
Chuquisaca 0.238* 0.015 0.064 0.405 
Cochabamba 0.306*** 0.000 0.273*** 9.82E-05 
El Beni -0.105 0.166 -0.032 0.589 
La Paz 0.228** 0.009 0.020 0.765 
Oruro 0.252** 0.006 0.099 0.161 
Potosi 0.247** 0.008 0.204** 0.005 
Santa Cruz 0.010 0.897 0.026 0.668 
Tarija -0.043 0.621 -0.055 0.417 
Coca 0.048 0.265 0.192*** 4.02E-08 
Percent Agriculture 0.0002 0.991 0.003 0.821 
Percent Mining -0.051 0.831 0.054 0.776 
Percent Industry -0.224 0.294 0.125 0.456 
Percent Public Utilities -3.449 0.377 -0.886 0.774 
Percent Construction -0.443 0.262 -0.643** 0.008 
Percent Commercial -0.049 0.883 -0.116 0.667 
Percent Transport and Comm. 0.875 0.245 0.529 0.371 
Percent Public Sector -0.058 0.947 -0.162 0.815 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05;  
%MAS 2005 Rsquare = 0.426, N = 311; %MAS 2002 Rsquare = 0.493, N = 313 
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Appendix 4 Regression 2 Results 
 
 %MAS 2005 %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. 
Percent Identify as Indigenous 0.242 0.268 0.0969 0.578 
Percent Not Identify as 
Indigenous 
0.181 0.372 0.0283 0.861 
Percent Poverty 0.109 0.608 0.0911 0.589 
Percent Illiteracy 0.209 0.136 0.212 0.0571 
Percent Employment 0.014 0.579 0.0112 0.549 
Percent No Home Ownership 0.0287 0.868 0.0821 0.536 
GDP Per Capita 4.16E-05 0.562 -3.62E-05 0.527 
Inequality -0.157 0.426 -0.0794 0.612 
Chuquisaca 0.230* 0.0159 0.0418 0.576 
Cochabamba 0.304*** 0.000350 0.236*** 0.000379 
El Beni -1.11E-01*** 1.27E-01 -6.16E-02 2.79E-01 
La Paz 0.219** 0.00706 -0.00658 0.917 
Oruro 2.51E-01** 4.12E-03 8.14E-02 2.34E-01 
Potosi 2.40E-01** 7.42E-03 1.75E-01* 1.29E-02 
Santa Cruz 2.97E-03 9.69E-01 -1.02E-02 8.63E-01 
Tarija -0.0439838 0.616 -0.0699 0.310 
Coca 3.63E-02 3.97E-01 1.85E-01*** 1.20E-07 
Total Agriculture 1.76E-06 4.77E-01 3.67E-06 6.27E-02 
Total Mining 2.80E-06 0.938 -4.70E-06 0.871 
Total Industry -2.72E-05 0.251 -1.58E-05 0.398 
Total Public Utilities -0.0003848 0.439 0.000118 0.761 
Total Construction -4.30E-05 0.390 -4.69E-05 0.224 
Total Commercial Service 7.65E-07 0.957 3.50E-06 0.757 
Total Transport and Comm. 0.0001194 0.103 6.27E-05 0.279 
Total Public Sector -3.50E-05 0.234 -0.0000308 0.184 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05;  
%MAS 2005 Rsquare = 0.427, N = 311; %MAS 2002 Rsquare = 0.489, N=311 
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Appendix 5 Regression 3 Results 
 %MAS 2005 %MAS 2002 
 coefficient significance coefficient significance 
Percent Other Indigenous 0.156 0.473 0.0403 0.816 
Percent Aymara 0.434 0.0545 0.228 0.204 
Percent Quechua 0.394 0.0848 0.252 0.168 
Percent Not Indigenous 0.232 0.250 0.0819 0.611 
Percent Poverty 0.079 0.7054 0.0732 0.661 
Percent Illiteracy 0.123 0.436 0.0961 0.440 
Percent Employment 0.013 0.605 0.0106 0.593 
Percent No Home Ownership  0.059 0.725 0.0782 0.559 
GDP Per Capita 7.69E-06 0.915 -6.11E-05 0.286 
Inequality -0.075 0.702 -0.0249 0.873 
Chuquisaca 0.177 0.0663 -0.00704 0.926 
Cochabamba 0.222* 0.0153 0.155* 0.0322 
El Beni -0.090 0.215 -0.0465 0.411 
La Paz 0.099 0.272 -0.0788 0.269 
Oruro 0.131 0.165 -0.00193 0.979 
Potosi 0.142 0.139 0.0866 0.253 
Santa Cruz 0.019 0.805 -0.00239 0.967 
Tarija -0.042 0.628 -0.0695 0.307 
Coca 0.040 0.350 0.185*** 9.17E-08 
Total in Agriculture 1.29E-06 0.598 3.26E-06 0.0947 
Total in Mining 9.65E-06 0.788 -2.04E-06 0.943 
Total in Industry -0.0000223 0.341 -1.19E-05 0.521 
Total in Public Utilities -0.0002874 0.559 0.000186 0.629 
Total in Construction -5.19E-05 0.295 -5.14E-05 0.179 
Total in Commercial 2.36E-06 0.866 4.91E-06 0.660 
Total in Transport and Comm. 0.000106 0.144 4.97E-05 0.387 
Total in Public Sector -2.93E-05 0.314 -2.58E-05 0.261 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05;  
%MAS 2005 Rsquare = 0.45 ; N = 311; %MAS 2002 Rsquare = 0.50; N = 313 
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Appendix 6 Regression 4 Results 
 %MAS 2005 %MAS 2002 
 coefficient significance Coefficient Significance 
Percent Other Indigenous .075 0.729 .033 0.842 
Percent Aymara 0.344 0.118 .378 0.171 
Percent Quechua 0.319 0.157 .264 0.138 
Percent Not Indigenous 0.152 0.444 .106 0.503 
Percent Poverty 0.128 .536 .37 0.871 
Percent Illiteracy .151 .378 .093 0.481 
Percent Employment .051 .276 .035 0.341 
Percent No Home Ownership .100 .567 .015 0.915 
GDP per capita .00000276 .717 -.000052 0.386 
Inequality -.101 .605 .0097 0.9501 
Chuquisaca .204* .0388 .026 0.731 
Cochabamba .234 .0134 .0.195** 0.0085 
El Beni -.078 0.298 -0.01 0.832 
La Paz .131 0.164 -0.046 0.531 
Oruro .142 0.143 0.015 0.846 
Potosi .166 0.089 0.113 0.108 
Santa Cruz .037 0.639 0.043 0.476 
Tarija -.036 0.674 -0.05 0.447 
Coca .045 0.297 0.186*** .000 
Percent Agriculture -.002 0.922 .001 .913 
Percent Mining -.045 0.852 .032 .864 
Percent Industrial -.169 0.423 .158 .338 
Percent Public Utilities -2.94 0.447 -.457 .881 
Percent Construction -.521 0.185 -.699** .004 
Percent Commercial -.104 0.755 -.154 .560 
Percent Transport. And Comm. 0.614 0.412 .283 .631 
Percent Public Sector 0.446 0.612 0.262 .705 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05;  
%MAS 2005 Rsquare = 0.44, N = 311; %MAS 2002 Rsquare = 0.51, N = 313 
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Appendix 7 Departmental Regression Results 
Chuquisaca %MAS 2005 %MAS 2002 
 Coefficie
nt 
Significance Coefficient Significance 
Percent Indigenous 1.90 .346 1.953 .226 
Percent Not Indigenous 1.82 .323 1.97 .182 
Percent Poverty -1.53 0.38 -1.781 .204 
Percent Illiteracy 0.833 .574 -0.096 .934 
Percent Employment -.515 .750 -.100 .937 
Percent No Home 
Ownership 
0.555 .751 -1.28 .359 
GDP Per Capita -.0002 .416 -.0005 .810 
Inequality 1.056 .343 .398 .645 
Percent Agriculture -.445 .206 -0.026 .921 
Percent Mining 7.569 .745 -0.535 .977 
Percent Industry 1.264 .366 1.164 .294 
Percent Utilities 23.341 .616 25.20 .494 
Percent Construction 0.018 .982 -0.152 .814 
Percent Commercial -0.94 .833 -2.41 .496 
Percent Transport and 
Comm. 
-7.363 .520 -1.49 .867 
Percent Public Sector -.2498 .883 7.64 .571 
Coca - - - - 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Cochabamba %MAS 2005 %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Percent Indigenous 0.786 .618 .678 .621 
Percent Not 
Indigenous 
1.917 .230 1.585 .252 
Percent Poverty -1.511 .275 -1.289 .287 
Percent Illiteracy .587 .361 .531 .347 
Percent Employment .254 .645 .166 .726 
Percent No Home 
Ownership 
.511 .384 .409 .426 
GDP Per Capita .0001 .799 -.0000008 .980 
Inequality -.554 .372 -.318 .544 
Percent Agriculture .193 .474 .135 .565 
Percent Mining -3.24 .600 -.047 .993 
Percent Industry .799 .231 .588 .313 
Percent Utilities -.662 .975 -10.24 .577 
Percent Construction -1.809 .179 -2.491 .021 
Percent Commercial -3.908* .043 -4.002* .019 
Percent Transport 
and Comm. 
2.506 .554 6.078 .110 
Percent Public Sector 1.67 .518 .420 .852 
Coca .133 .156 .263** .003 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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El Beni %MAS 2005 %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Percent Indigenous 0.611 .773 -0.174 .864 
Percent Not 
Indigenous 
1.011 .682 -0.137 .907 
Percent Poverty -0.068 .975 0.361 .736 
Percent Illiteracy -4.67 .245 -0.574 .738 
Percent Employment 2.68 .664 0.544 .853 
Percent No Home 
Ownership 
0.220 .952 -0.267 .879 
GDP Per Capita -0.001 .564 -.0005 .989 
Inequality -0.758 .841 -0.691 .708 
Percent Agriculture -0.018 .892 -0.011 .866 
Percent Mining -2.755 .806 -1.196 .824 
Percent Industry -2.26 .469 -0.965 .517 
Percent Utilities 17.398 .849 -7.39 .867 
Percent Construction -6.281 .649 -1.34 .839 
Percent Commercial 5.751 .348 2.195 .445 
Percent Transport 
and Comm. 
-0.040 .997 -1.23 .832 
Percent Public Sector 1.463 .832 -0.323 .923 
Coca - - - - 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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La Paz %MAS 2005 %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Percent Indigenous 2.033 0.57 1.005 1.57 
Percent Not 
Indigenous 
2.246* 0.021 1.062 .098 
Percent Poverty -0.39 .536 -0.281 .507 
Percent Illiteracy -0.203 .570 -0.346 .129 
Percent Employment -0.124* .042 -0.038 .333 
Percent No Home 
Ownership 
0.136 .771 0.408 .188 
GDP Per Capita -0.0001 .656 -0.0009 .656 
Inequality -1.733 .134 -1.604 .031 
Percent Agriculture -0.878* .023 -0.190 .446 
Percent Mining -0.46 .509 .506 .239 
Percent Industry -1.714* .014 -0.584 .201 
Percent Utilities 11.83 .121 -16.001** .002 
Percent Construction -1.42 .317 -0.540 .110 
Percent Commercial -0.86 .097 -0.281 0.413 
Percent Transport 
and Comm. 
0.096 .958 -0.856 .467 
Percent Public Sector 0.111 .977 -1.109 .658 
Coca 0.038 .602 0.121 0.107 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Oruro %MAS 2005 %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Percent Indigenous 3.018 .288 2.072 .329 
Percent Not 
Indigenous 
2.77 .313 2.156 .293 
Percent Poverty -0.872 .644 -1.301 .347 
Percent Illiteracy -0.873 .424 -0.272 .730 
Percent Employment 1.846 .787 -0.541 .357 
Percent No Home 
Ownership 
-1.117 0.510 -0.076 .951 
GDP Per Capita -0.0008 .514 -0.0003 .742 
Inequality -0.231 .887 -1.590 .190 
Percent Agriculture -0.858 .780 -0.236 .811 
Percent Mining .368 .851 -0.440 .765 
Percent Industry -0.858 .780 -0.492 .842 
Percent Utilities -9.80 .759 -23.103 .329 
Percent Construction 1.028 .583 -1.116 .415 
Percent Commercial 1.99 .514 1.617 .514 
Percent Transport 
and Comm. 
-2.796 .584 -1.716 541 
Percent Public Sector -2.334 .653 -1.758 .644 
Coca - - - - 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
69 
Pando %MAS 2005 %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Percent Indigenous 3.018 .827 .0618 .950 
Percent Not Indigenous 4.472 .773 .0491 .958 
Percent Poverty -1.69 .578 -0.501 .367 
Percent Illiteracy 1.846 .787 -0.541 .357 
Percent Employment 2.155 .375 1.206 .048 
Percent No Home 
Ownership 
- - - - 
GDP Per Capita -0.0004 .951 .001 .350 
Inequality -2.81 .901 .077 .977 
Percent Agriculture -4.0003 .687 -.900 .153 
Percent Mining -4.446 .669 -1.293 .333 
Percent Industry -2.132 .856 -0.280 .796 
Percent Utilities - - - - 
Percent Construction -11.84 .456 -6.38 .075 
Percent Commercial -2.786 .605 -1.185 .278 
Percent Transport and 
Comm. 
4.993 .717 0.1068 .964 
Percent Public Sector - - - - 
Coca - - - - 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Potosi %MAS 2005 %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Percent Indigenous 4.913 .096 3.843 .266 
Percent Not 
Indigenous 
5.458 .054 3.98 .227 
Percent Poverty -3.728 .163 -3.035 .335 
Percent Illiteracy -0.003 .993 -0.103 .760 
Percent Employment -0.038 .492 .375* 0.023 
Percent No Home 
Ownership 
-0.108 .864 -0.056 .941 
GDP Per Capita -0.009 .301 -0.001 .299 
Inequality -1.44* .031 -.789 .301 
Percent Agriculture -0.011 .556 -0.017 .446 
Percent Mining 0.127 .820 .0358 .957 
Percent Industry 0.570 .486 1.411 .156 
Percent Utilities 9.81 .283 12.309 .260 
Percent Construction 1.528 .145 1.307 .290 
Percent Commercial -1.54 .254 -00.261 .869 
Percent Transport 
and Comm. 
-0.505 .891 -4.319 .330 
Percent Public Sector -7.443 .305 4.524 .598 
Coca - - - - 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Santa Cruz %MAS 2005 %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Percent Indigenous -0.054 .930 -0.082 .862 
Percent Not 
Indigenous 
-0.113 .857 -0.231 .627 
Percent Poverty -0.198 .714 0.0243 .953 
Percent Illiteracy 0.814 .124 -0.225 .568 
Percent Employment .535 0.078 0.447 .053 
Percent No Home 
Ownership 
0.507 .294 0.0697 .847 
GDP Per Capita -0.00008 .279 -0.0005 .768 
Inequality 0.005 .990 -0.021 .953 
Percent Agriculture 0.146 .495 0.120 .460 
Percent Mining -1.00 .659 -1.83 .292 
Percent Industry -0.336 .657 -0.859 .140 
Percent Utilities -5.850 .583 24.50 .309 
Percent Construction -0.0951 .951 .1345 .253 
Percent Commercial 1.458 .327 1.67 .141 
Percent Transport 
and Comm. 
0.731 .754 -1.85 .297 
Percent Public Sector -0.045 .983 -3.326* .043 
Coca - - - - 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Tarija %MAS 2005 %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Percent Indigenous 4.054 .239 -0.339 .321 
Percent Not 
Indigenous 
3.490 .231 .223 .386 
Percent Poverty -2.423 .290 .556 .156 
Percent Illiteracy -0.409 .529 -0.198 .199 
Percent Employment - - - - 
Percent No Home 
Ownership 
- - - - 
GDP Per Capita -0.001 .226 -0.0002 .131 
Inequality -1.947 .419 -1.657 .067 
Percent Agriculture 0.031 .303 -0.026 .044 
Percent Mining -0.954 .479 0.149 .389 
Percent Industry - - - - 
Percent Utilities - - - - 
Percent Construction - - - - 
Percent Commercial 3.078 .431 1.017 .177 
Percent Transport 
and Comm. 
0.491 .740 0.771 .109 
Percent Public Sector - - - - 
Coca - - - - 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Appendix 8 Departmental Results Disaggregated Indigenous 
Chuquisaca %MAS 2005  %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Intercept 1.490 0.430 1.382 0.325 
Percent Quechua 0.280 0.320 0.100 0.629 
Percent Aymara -21.770 0.290 2.943 0.842 
Percent Other 0.534 0.300 0.578 0.141 
Percent Poverty -1.210 0.420 -1.536 0.175 
Percent Employment 0.510 0.710 0.685 0.496 
Percent No Home Ownership -0.320 0.810 -1.879 0.081 
Percent Agriculture -0.320 0.230 -0.007 0.971 
Percent Mining -17.400 0.370 -11.924 0.411 
Percent Industrial 0.340 0.720 0.706 0.328 
Percent Public Utilities 61.400 0.200 42.603 0.236 
Percent Construction 0.140 0.860 0.176 0.764 
Percent Commercial -3.460 0.400 -4.762 0.130 
Percent Transport and Comm. 3.030 0.780 6.713 0.403 
Percent Public Sector 8.680 0.560 11.658 0.292 
Inequality 0.045 0.910 0.028 0.926 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
 
Cochabamba %MAS 2005  %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Intercept 0.949 0.318 0.188 0.833 
Percent Quechua 1.176** 0.005 1.006* 0.010 
Percent Aymara 1.198 0.117 1.208 0.096 
Percent Other 0.212 0.966 8.917 0.066 
Percent Poverty -1.627 0.074 -0.853 0.308 
Percent Employment 0.499 0.377 0.379 0.469 
Percent No Home Ownership 0.326 0.574 0.090 0.869 
Percent Agriculture 0.185 0.471 0.150 0.536 
Percent Mining -0.806 0.890 2.154 0.695 
Percent Industry 0.628 0.352 0.515 0.420 
Percent Public Utilities 4.123 0.842 -1.827 0.925 
Percent Construction -1.894 0.165 -2.414* 0.041 
Percent Commercial -3.672 0.058 -3.348 0.065 
Percent Transport and Comm. 2.232 0.598 6.325 0.121 
Percent Public Sector 2.929 0.499 -3.495 0.393 
Inequality -0.284 0.652 -0.067 0.907 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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El Beni %MAS 2005  %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Intercept -1.002 0.690 -0.422 0.575 
Percent Quechua 0.390 0.949 0.072 0.968 
Percent Aymara 1.671 0.650 1.146 0.320 
Percent Other -0.370 0.646 -0.135 0.574 
Percent Poverty 1.718 0.327 0.722 0.188 
Percent Employment -0.063 0.989 0.251 0.849 
Percent No Home Ownership 1.044 0.777 -0.105 0.923 
Percent Mining -3.619 0.752 -1.747 0.610 
Percent Industry -4.441 0.503 -2.829 0.189 
Percent Public Utilities 9.706 0.896 -1.844 0.933 
Percent Construction 0.098 0.994 1.055 0.794 
Percent Commercial 6.269 0.285 2.922 0.124 
Percent Transport and Comm. -9.421 0.445 -3.827 0.310 
Percent Public Sector 1.230 0.866 0.435 0.840 
Inequality -1.293 0.724 -0.472 0.664 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
 
 
La Paz %MAS 2005  %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Intercept 1.701* 0.012 0.373 0.436 
Percent Quechua -0.364 0.413 -0.046 0.886 
Percent Aymara -0.280 0.515 0.002 0.996 
Percent Other -1.491 0.177 -0.465 0.557 
Percent Poverty 0.083 0.829 -0.067 0.807 
Percent Employment -0.112 0.053 -0.012 0.777 
Percent No Home Ownership 0.108 0.742 0.857 0.001 
Percent Agriculture -0.724 0.036 0.048 0.842 
Percent Mining -0.463 0.475 0.472 0.280 
Percent Industry -1.499* 0.022 -0.408 0.383 
Percent Public Utilities -9.414 0.200 -15.666** 0.003 
Percent Construction -1.829 0.152 -0.532 0.113 
Percent Commercial -0.977* 0.045 -0.270 0.431 
Percent Transport and Comm. 0.966 0.552 0.290 0.801 
Percent Public Sector -1.521 0.661 -2.736 0.264 
Inequality -0.727 0.512 -0.639 0.403 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Oruro %MAS 2005  %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Intercept 1.167 0.449 1.487 0.275 
Percent Quechua -0.332 0.567 0.034 0.937 
Percent Aymara -0.334 0.546 0.064 0.878 
Percent Other 0.188 0.787 0.208 0.690 
Percent Poverty 0.191 0.859 -0.991 0.237 
Percent Employment 0.016 0.837 -0.018 0.752 
Percent No Home Ownership -0.990 0.554 -0.033 0.979 
Percent Agriculture -0.406 0.728 -0.097 0.921 
Percent Mining 0.456 0.806 -0.389 0.785 
Percent Industry -3.932 0.281 -1.337 0.648 
Percent Public Utilities -10.909 0.717 -22.986 0.311 
Percent Construction 1.177 0.545 -1.167 0.421 
Percent Commercial 2.823 0.353 1.724 0.496 
Percent Transport and Comm. -1.207 0.779 -1.331 0.676 
Percent Public Sector -1.890 0.704 -1.567 0.674 
Inequality -0.095 0.952 -1.571 0.185 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
 
Pando %MAS 2005  %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Percent Quechua -50.634 0.289 -14.392 0.289 
Percent Aymara 80.456 0.262 24.123 0.253 
Percent Other 6.210 0.269 2.461 0.196 
Percent Poverty -13.630 0.292 -2.937 0.194 
Percent Employment 16.973 0.282 4.586 0.181 
Percent No Home Ownership -4.599 0.376 -0.091 0.916 
Percent Agriculture 1.534 0.605 -0.933 0.279 
Percent Mining 36.602 0.365 4.269 0.454 
Percent Industry 16.187 0.291 3.531 0.304 
Percent Public Utilities 1078.052 0.365 146.125 0.340 
Percent Construction -60.389 0.258 -19.613 0.169 
Percent Commercial -20.080 0.311 -4.785 0.289 
Percent Transport and Comm. -4.055 0.802 4.257 0.306 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Potosi %MAS 2005  %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Intercept 1.223 0.370 -0.599 0.724 
Percent Quechua -0.591 0.186 -0.267 0.626 
Percent Aymara -0.398 0.382 -0.069 0.903 
Percent Other 10.727 0.101 9.844 0.222 
Percent Poverty 0.101 0.920 1.157 0.363 
Percent Employment -0.084 0.057 -0.025 0.635 
Percent No Home Ownership 0.870 0.226 0.857 0.338 
Percent Agriculture -0.002 0.914 -0.006 0.771 
Percent Mining -0.369 0.510 -0.402 0.566 
Percent Industry 1.371* 0.014 2.068** 0.004 
Percent Public Utilities 7.175 0.387 10.288 0.322 
Percent Construction 1.651 0.086 1.480 0.211 
Percent Commercial -2.473* 0.019 -1.359 0.278 
Percent Transport and Comm. 5.202 0.140 1.363 0.751 
Percent Public Sector -15.553* 0.014 -3.692 0.616 
Inequality -1.148 0.076 -0.562 0.473 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
 
Santa Cruz %MAS 2005  %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Intercept -0.219 0.609 -0.177 0.506 
Percent Quechua 0.547* 0.020 0.713*** 0.000 
Percent Aymara -0.711 0.483 0.257 0.682 
Percent Other -0.048 0.717 0.073 0.375 
Percent Poverty 0.155 0.669 0.100 0.656 
Percent Employment 0.348 0.219 0.248 0.160 
Percent No Home Ownership 0.619 0.211 0.065 0.830 
Percent Agriculture 0.110 0.580 -0.023 0.855 
Percent Mining -0.482 0.820 -0.783 0.554 
Percent Industry 0.127 0.862 -0.289 0.526 
Percent Public Utilities 2.893 0.918 15.743 0.371 
Percent Construction -0.971 0.511 0.535 0.560 
Percent Commercial 0.417 0.714 0.473 0.505 
Percent Transport and Comm. 0.173 0.935 -1.532 0.247 
Percent Public Sector 2.621 0.237 -0.463 0.734 
Inequality -0.234 0.564 -0.150 0.552 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Tarija %MAS 2005  %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Intercept 0.201 0.155 -0.045 0.704 
Percent Quechua 0.394*** 0.000 0.408*** 0.000 
Percent Aymara 0.333*** 0.000 0.194*** 0.000 
Percent Other -0.085 0.305 -0.006 0.927 
Percent Poverty 0.128 0.372 0.159 0.188 
Percent Employment 0.008 0.759 0.001 0.974 
Percent No Home Ownership 0.057 0.721 0.204 0.133 
Percent Agriculture -0.008 0.647 0.004 0.800 
Percent Mining -0.130 0.560 -0.261 0.163 
Percent Industry -0.194 0.329 -0.069 0.678 
Percent Public Utilities -1.847 0.627 0.905 0.777 
Percent Construction -0.417 0.283 -0.700 0.006 
Percent Commercial 0.045 0.882 -0.208 0.415 
Percent Transport and Comm. 0.169 0.799 0.052 0.925 
Percent Public Sector 0.449 0.601 0.548 0.450 
Inequality 0.121 0.392 -0.110 0.352 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Appendix 9a Robustness Test Identify as Indigenous 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 %MAS 2005 %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Percent Identify as Indigenous 0.074 0.340 0.055 0.363 
Percent No Home Ownership 0.067 0.702 -0.024 0.864 
Percent Employment 0.015 0.554 0.010 0.634 
Percent Poverty 0.132 0.418 0.150 0.245 
Percent Agriculture 0.001 0.975 0.004 0.789 
Percent Mining -0.065 0.786 0.065 0.731 
Percent Industry -0.099 0.630 0.193 0.229 
Percent Public Utilities -3.338 0.393 -0.761 0.806 
Percent Construction -0.459 0.244 -0.634** 0.009 
Percent Commercial -0.004 0.989 -0.177 0.492 
Percent Transportation and 
Comm. 
0.536 0.444 0.104 0.851 
Percent Public Sector -0.201 0.818 -0.223 0.746 
Chuquisaca 0.449* 0.011 0.093 0.510 
Cochabamba 0.524** 0.003 0.289 0.038 
El Beni 0.097 0.566 -0.029 0.831 
La Paz 0.434** 0.008 0.029 0.824 
Oruro 0.434 0.012 0.089 0.512 
Pando 0.222 0.133 0.027 0.815 
Potosi 0.451* 0.011 0.224 0.111 
Santa Cruz 0.206 0.241 0.022 0.874 
Tarija 0.193 0.252 -0.032 0.810 
Coca 0.041 0.336 0.185*** 0.000 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05     
%MAS 2005 Rsquare = 0.42, N = 311; %MAS 2002 Rsquare = 0.48, N = 313 
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Appendix 9b Robustness Test Disaggregated Indigenous 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 %MAS 2005 %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Percent Quechua 0.196* 0.024 0.171* 0.013 
Percent Aymara 0.189* 0.040 0.123 0.091 
Percent Other -0.096 0.285 -0.082 0.247 
Percent No Home Ownership 0.084 0.625 -0.022 0.870 
Percent Employment 0.011 0.646 0.006 0.761 
Percent Poverty 0.123 0.441 0.138 0.278 
Percent Agriculture -0.001 0.948 0.002 0.871 
Percent Mining -0.073 0.758 0.035 0.853 
Percent Industry -0.114 0.574 0.159 0.318 
Percent Public Utilities -2.628 0.495 -0.259 0.932 
Percent Construction -0.573 0.143 -0.710** 0.003 
Percent Commercial -0.057 0.857 -0.213 0.401 
Percent Transportation and Comm. 0.428 0.538 0.058 0.915 
Percent Public Sector 0.404 0.644 0.259 0.706 
Chuquisaca 0.401* 0.022 0.053 0.702 
Cochabamba 0.434* 0.013 0.212 0.125 
El Beni 0.138 0.408 0.014 0.919 
La Paz 0.346* 0.039 -0.015 0.908 
Oruro 0.347* 0.045 0.040 0.771 
Pando 0.225 0.124 0.039 0.735 
Potosi 0.357* 0.043 0.147 0.292 
Santa Cruz 0.245 0.158 0.060 0.664 
Tarija 0.193 0.245 -0.025 0.847 
Coca 0.042 0.326 0.183*** 0.000 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05     
%MAS 2005 Rsquare = 0.44, N = 311; %MAS 2002 Rsquare = 0.51, N = 313 
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Appendix 10a Robustness Test Identify as Indigenous 
 %MAS 2005 %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Percent Identify as Indigenous 0.076 0.323 0.057 0.351 
Percent No Home Ownership 0.074 0.671 -0.019 0.893 
Percent Employment 0.014 0.579 0.009 0.654 
Percent Poverty 0.116 0.477 0.142 0.276 
Inequality -0.158 0.402 -0.089 0.549 
Percent Agriculture 0.000 0.994 0.003 0.804 
Percent Mining -0.070 0.770 0.061 0.746 
Percent Industry -0.120 0.560 0.182 0.261 
Percent Public Utilities -3.277 0.402 -0.723 0.816 
Percent Construction -0.435 0.272 -0.627* 0.010 
Percent Commercial 0.004 0.990 -0.172 0.506 
Percent Transport and Comm. 0.507 0.470 0.089 0.873 
Percent Public Sector -0.117 0.894 -0.177 0.799 
Chuquisaca 0.516** 0.008 0.131 0.397 
Cochabamba 0.563** 0.002 0.312* 0.031 
El Beni 0.127 0.460 -0.011 0.934 
La Paz 0.469** 0.006 0.049 0.717 
Oruro 0.473** 0.008 0.111 0.430 
Pando 0.247 0.103 0.041 0.732 
Potosi 0.501** 0.007 0.253 0.089 
Santa Cruz 0.251 0.173 0.047 0.746 
Tarija 0.226 0.192 -0.014 0.920 
Coca 0.044 0.307 0.186*** 0.000 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05     
%MAS 2005 Rsquare 0.42, N = 311; %MAS 2002 Rsquare = 0.49, N = 313 
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Appendix 10b Robustness Test Disaggregated Indigenous 
 %MAS 2005 %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Percent Quechua 0.196* 0.024 0.171* 0.013 
Percent Aymara 0.189* 0.041 0.123 0.092 
Percent Other -0.092 0.308 -0.080 0.260 
Percent No Home Ownership 0.088 0.610 -0.020 0.883 
Percent Employment 0.011 0.662 0.006 0.772 
Percent Poverty 0.114 0.480 0.134 0.296 
Inequality -0.095 0.609 -0.043 0.772 
Percent Agriculture -0.001 0.937 0.002 0.878 
Percent Mining -0.077 0.747 0.033 0.862 
Percent Industry -0.127 0.534 0.153 0.338 
Percent Public Utilities -2.602 0.500 -0.245 0.936 
Percent Construction -0.557 0.156 -0.706** 0.003 
Percent Commercial -0.051 0.872 -0.210 0.409 
Percent Transportation and 
Comm. 
0.413 0.553 0.052 0.924 
Percent Public Sector 0.446 0.612 0.278 0.689 
Chuquisaca 0.443* 0.022 0.071 0.639 
Cochabamba 0.459* 0.011 0.223 0.120 
El Beni 0.156 0.360 0.022 0.873 
La Paz 0.369* 0.034 -0.005 0.970 
Oruro 0.372* 0.039 0.051 0.719 
Pando 0.239 0.108 0.045 0.699 
Potosi 0.388* 0.038 0.161 0.277 
Santa Cruz 0.271 0.134 0.072 0.618 
Tarija 0.213 0.212 -0.017 0.903 
Coca 0.043 0.311 0.183*** 0.000 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05     
%MAS 2005 Rsquare = 0.44, N = 311; %MAS 2002 Rsquare = 0.51, N = 313 
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Appendix 11a Robustness Test Identify as Indigenous 
 %MAS 2005 %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Percent Identify as Indigenous 0.067 0.375 0.051 0.392 
Percent Illiteracy 0.277 0.060 0.249* 0.032 
Percent No Home Ownership 0.067 0.676 -0.038 0.761 
Inequality -0.133 0.477 -0.069 0.637 
Percent Employment 0.012 0.626 0.006 0.726 
Percent Agriculture 0.000412 0.981 0.003 0.774 
Percent Mining -0.055 0.815 0.079 0.672 
Percent Industry -0.203 0.334 0.112 0.493 
Percent Public Utilities -3.643 0.345 -1.165 0.702 
Percent Construction -0.450 0.251 -0.661** 0.005 
Percent Commercial -0.018 0.951 -0.212 0.391 
Percent Transport and Comm. 0.956 0.196 0.492 0.398 
Percent Public Sector -0.086 0.920 -0.162 0.813 
Chuquisaca 0.522*** 0.000 0.175 0.054 
Cochabamba 0.592*** 0.000 0.374*** 0.000 
El Beni 0.180* 0.035 0.070 0.294 
La Paz 0.509*** 0.000 0.117 0.111 
Oruro 0.535*** 0.000 0.201** 0.008 
Pando 0.270** 0.001 0.093 0.148 
Potosi 0.527*** 0.000 0.312*** 0.000 
Santa Cruz 0.303*** 0.000 0.132 0.051 
Tarija 0.246* 0.011 0.039 0.607 
Coca 0.051 0.233 0.193*** 0.000 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05   
%MAS 2005 Rsquare = 0.43, N = 311; %MAS 2002 Rsquare = 0.49, N = 313 
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Appendix 11b Robustness Test Disaggregated Indigenous 
 %MAS 2005 %MAS 2002 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Percent Quechua 0.175 0.054 0.160* 0.026 
Percent Aymara 0.191* 0.038 0.127 0.081 
Percent Other -0.078 0.386 -0.067 0.343 
Percent No Home Ownership 0.069 0.671 -0.056 0.664 
Percent Employment 0.010 0.685 0.005 0.813 
Percent Illiteracy 0.161 0.327 0.114 0.377 
Inequality -0.092 0.622 -0.045 0.758 
Percent Agriculture -0.001 0.974 0.003 0.825 
Percent Mining -0.046 0.845 0.061 0.746 
Percent Industry -0.162 0.439 0.135 0.408 
Percent Public Utilities -3.004 0.432 -0.682 0.821 
Percent Construction -0.549 0.162 -0.726** 0.002 
Percent Commercial -0.089 0.774 -0.264 0.282 
Percent Transportation and 
Comm. 
0.647 0.381 0.221 0.704 
Percent Public Sector 0.400 0.649 0.233 0.736 
Chuquisaca 0.503*** 0.000 0.168 0.064 
Cochabamba 0.535*** 0.000 0.327*** 0.000 
El Beni 0.225* 0.012 0.120 0.086 
La Paz 0.430*** 0.000 0.086 0.308 
Oruro 0.452*** 0.000 0.157 0.056 
Pando 0.290** 0.001 0.124 0.062 
Potosi 0.461*** 0.000 0.264** 0.002 
Santa Cruz 0.346*** 0.000 0.179* 0.011 
Tarija 0.268** 0.007 0.071 0.363 
Coca 0.049 0.249 0.188*** 0.000 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05     
%MAS 2005 Rsquare = 0.44, N = 311; %MAS 2002 Rsquare = 0.51, N = 313 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
